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**Democratization in Post-Suharto Indonesia**, edited by Marco Bünte and Andreas Ufen.

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Just as the sudden emergence of the worlds' third largest democracy was a puzzle to scholars in the late 90s, its present character is now a subject of intense debates. These are debates in the plural and thus difficult to get a good grasp of. One reason is the different and often normative points of departure. Another is the increasingly polycentric polity, based on the fact that democratisation was more due to the crisis and dismantling of the old regime than to organised and target-oriented struggle for a new. There are three major types of studies. The first is the surveys of people's perceptions and top down expert assessments of the situation. Evaluators and policy directors in the democracy aid business are in the forefront, but some scholars and activists try alternatives rooted among the democrats themselves. The academic quality varies with the concepts and sources. The second is case studies of critical puzzles where a range of contextual factors are analysed with concepts that make sense. This is the dominant trend among Indonesianists. The third is the theory driven approaches that study theses systematically, to thus facilitate comparison, disputation and generalisation. Bünte and Ufen's anthology is a fine example of the latter; introducing, moreover, in several of the chapters, German scholarship on Indonesia to a wider readership.

Their book begins with a liberal democratic definition of democracy, categorising a number of possible regimes. The implication (based on Diamond, Linz, Stepan and especially Wolfgang Merkel), is that one should focus on central state institutions, political parties, veto actors and civil society to thus judge the Indonesian regime. Is it a hybrid democracy, an electoral one, or perhaps a liberal star? This design can be disputed, of course, and I shall

return to some drawbacks. But it works well as a broad systematisation of a book that aims at ‘an overview of the difficult, multilayered and often contradictory results of the democratization process’ (p.4). Bünthe and Ufen’s introduction is followed by four reviews of state institutions: Patrick Ziegenhain on the increasingly powerful but inefficient legislature, Petra Stockmann on the poor rule of law, Sofie Arjon Schütte on the rampant corruption and Bünthe on the decentralisation that did away with centralised despotism at the possible price of local replications. Marcus Mitzner’s supplementary case study of direct elections in North Sulawesi adds, however, less pessimistic insights about wider political spaces and elitist contestation. In the second part Ufen provides a much needed review of political parties and Dirk Tomsa discusses the supposedly strong but actually weak organisation of the former ruling Golkar party. In part three on veto actors Christian Chua discloses how big capitalists adapt to democracy and Jun Honna discusses the relative subordination of the military to civilian rule. Finally in the fourth part there is unfortunately less on non-veto actors in general than on civil society groups in particular. But Mikaela Nyman has a clear-cut argument in favour of their importance, in spite of fragmentation. Bob Sugeng Hadiwinata gives an overview of the diverse associations that need to be considered if civil society is defined empirically rather than theoretically as rights bearing citizens who come together. And Felix Heiduk widens the perspective with an historical review of the separatist movements against authoritarianism.

Generally this is good political science of institutions; and as such the only complaints are that the potential to include international comparisons has not been utilised and that the pieces on civil society could have been better related to the politics of democracy. The more serious problem is what falls on the roadside given the tight theoretical base. It is not clear, for instance, how the editors arrive at the conclusion (p.23) that the major problem is

insufficient rule of law. This may well follow from liberal democratic regime theory. But if democracy is defined more universally as popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, which liberals but also others would agree on, one may also consider the capacity of both people themselves to use democracy and of the institutions to implement decisions. And thus the decisive problem may rather be representation, especially the lack of inclusion of the majority of people based on their own aspirations and organisations. The problem is that the tight framework of the book does not really allow for a debate on what conclusion is right. Similarly, when Nyman refers to wider studies she considers the positive results about civil society institutions that fit into her framework but not what the same studies say of their poor organisational and political capacity. And the chapter on corruption discusses institutions to contain crook officials but not struggle against the political economy that enables businessmen to pay them off. On the other hand, Chua's chapter that does address the supply side of corruption (with a brilliant analysis of how the liberal dream that free markets would do away with corruption has turned into a nightmare of capitalists buying up democracy) neglects that even rich businessmen need political legitimacy and authority to make their way, thus having to relate to leaders that can win elections.

Yet this does not prevent the general conclusion that the anthology should be essential for anyone in search of an advanced introduction to Indonesian democracy as well as for scholars who need to broaden their specialisations. In this respect it is only to be regretted that publishing takes time while Indonesia changes. But the quality of the arguments helps. Heiduk, for instance, does not only invalidate the thesis that democratisation tends to foster conflict when he refers to the fact that 'it was not "too much" democratization that triggered the conflicts in Aceh and Papua after 1998, but rather the lack of it' (p.298). Thus he also predicted that peace in Aceh would come with more democracy, which it did.