INDONESIAN POLITICS AND CITIZENSHIP IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

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The aim of this chapter is to provide historical background for the contemporary politics of citizenship in Indonesia. This subject has become increasingly popular as the country has witnessed the emergence of civil- and popular-based movements claiming citizenship rights. The concept of citizenship discussed in the book is centred on the issues of membership and the entitlements and responsibilities attached to it (see Chapter 2). While the process of institutionalisation always plays an important role, the formation of citizenship is historically a result of social and political struggles. In this light, the analysis of citizenship should also take into account the power relations between the State and society, as well as between the dominant and the subordinated groups in society at large.

T.H. Marshall's (1950) seminal work contributes significantly to the study of citizenship. His argument on the historical evolution of different rights provides scholars on the subject with general ideas of how citizenship comes into being and is institutionalised. However, it is in this very evolutionary and institutionalist approach that the limitations of Marshall's work are found. Such an approach does not consider the power relations deemed particularly important in this chapter on the history of politics of citizenship. Michael Mann (1987), by contrast, looks at class struggles. According to Mann, the formation of citizenship should be understood and explained in view of the strategy adopted by the dominant class to counter the challenges of the subordinate class. Their strategy is largely to institutionalise and regulate class struggles. Since the balance of class powers differ between countries, Mann finds that there are various routes to the formation of citizenship.

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Bryan Turner (1992) argues similarly. However, he criticises Mann for only paying attention to the dominant class strategy while ignoring the struggles and resistance launched by the oppressed and marginalised. Combining these two processes, Turner arrives at the conclusion that the formation of citizenship could be 'from above' and 'from below'. 'Citizenship from above' can be understood through a combination of Mann's argument about dominant class strategies and Marshall's emphasis on the institutionalisation of rights: it is a strategy for regulating class struggles through the institutionalisation of different rights. 'Citizenship from below', meanwhile, comprises struggles to claim citizenship rights and widen the claims for citizenship by the excluded social classes. Turner elaborates on this by making a distinction between socio-economic exclusion and cultural exclusion. The latter often leads to struggles for citizenship in the form of identity politics for inclusion and recognition within the community of citizens.

This chapter is framed by arguments similar to those of Mann and Turner. As mentioned above, the formation of citizenship should be understood in view of the struggles over power in society, that is, political contentions between diverse actors with different interests, strategies, and capacities (Tarrow and Tilly 2007). The politics of citizenship takes the form of struggles for recognition, for social and economic justice, and for democracy and popular representation (see Chapter 2). In the same way as studies of democratisation serve as an historical frame for analyses of current democracies, discussions of present problems of citizenship in Indonesia may therefore benefit from a brief sketch of the long-term conflicts in given communities, between dominant elites and aspiring actors who want to be (as Aristotle put it) part of the people that both govern and are being governed.[1] In these processes, the *contending actors* tend to have different views of *what constitutes the community and its citizens, how it should be governed, the mode of political participation and representation,*

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[1] http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.3.three.html (Book one and two.) Accessed 22.01.2017

and what civil, political, and social rights should apply. We shall sketch, in comparative perspective, the general characteristics of these pillars in citizenship politics before discussing their development in Indonesia over time.

First, the actors' character in terms of socio-economic basis and interests. The dominant actors in Indonesia include historical emperors and colonisers, as well as more recent authoritarian and exclusionary leaders. By contrast, intellectual and bourgeois groups with demands for citizenship were quite common, just like in the Global North (Anderson 1983). In addition, peasants and agrarian labour were crucial actors in the context of anti-colonial quests for equal citizenship, just as in Vietnam and the Indian state of Kerala.

Second, the actors' views of *how the community/communities are constituted and governed and who should take part in governance.* This has primarily been the story of nationalism. Yet, as argued by Indonesianist-cum-comparativist Ben Anderson (1983; 2016), nationalism is not another 'ism' in terms of a specific system of ideas and ideology. Rather, it is about communities that are popularly imagined *or* constructed by States and authoritarian leaders. Various nationalisms are therefore characterised by different ideas about who should be citizens (rather than subjects) and take part in governance. For example, Anderson mentions four types: the relatively universal creole-nationalism with historical rather than ethnic or religious roots; the more vernacular variant with stronger linguistic and territorial base; the top-down constructed nationalism; and the emancipatory anti-colonial nationalism that often came with international solidarity between nations that has, in many cases, deteriorated.[2]

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[2] In in his memoirs, Anderson concludes: "For a long time, different forms of socialism—anarchist, Leninist, New Leftist, social-democratic—provided a 'global' framework in which a progressive, emancipationist nationalism could flourish. Since the fall of 'communism' there has been a global vacuum, partially filled by feminism, environmentalism, neo-anarchism, and various other 'isms', fighting in different and not always cooperative ways against the barrenness of neoliberalism and hypocritical 'human rights' interventionism. But a lot of work, over a long period of time, will be needed to fill the vacuum". (Anderson 2016:194)

Third, the different views of governance in terms of (a) centralised vs decentralised rule; (b) direct vs indirect rule; and (c) limited vs extensive scope and capacity of the State. Historically, dominant regimes in Asia include the unitary autocratic type, as in China; the centrally despotic but often decentralised and multi-cultural empires of the Ottoman kind; and the colonial states with hierarchical forms of racism and indirect rule through subordinated local lords. Subsequently, a number of often increasingly authoritarian post-colonial versions followed suit; only the elitist Indian democracy stood reasonably tall. From the 1980s, however, authoritarianism was reformed by either more freedoms plus decentralised new public management, as in Indonesia, or by state-socialist-market reforms, as in China and Vietnam. Meanwhile, opponents tried new ideals of building active citizen based governance from below, for example in Porto Alegre (Brazil) and Kerala (India).

Fourth, the different views on the mode of political participation and representation. Dominant actors have historically restricted participation and representation to those considered educated and able, i.e. the colonial elite and to some degree cooperative local leaders. Post-colonial participation of the masses tended to remain indirect, via traditional leaders and new politicians. In India, for example, common people were incorporated into politics behind patrons and populist leaders instead of being represented through organisations of their own, while aspiring actors tended to resort to cadre or populist leadership of variably defined people.[3] In authoritarian cases, ordinary people were instead 'led' by parties (such as in China) or, until the third wave of democracy, by strong leaders (such as in Latin America) or by such leaders in combination with state-corporatist organisations (such as in Indonesia). Meanwhile, however, there were also examples of efforts to combine or replace authoritarianism and the incorporation of people into politics with educational movements and

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[3] Populism may be delineated, generally, in terms of anti-elitism and supposedly direct relations between acclaimed leaders and a notoriously unspecified 'people'.

citizens' action from below. The best cases include Kerala's history of the library movement, along with peasant and labour organisations plus cadre parties, in the struggle for land reform, and the later campaign for popular participation in local planning. (Harriss & Törnquist 2016)

Fifth, the contenting views of what citizens' civil, political, and social rights should apply and whether they should be granted constitutionally, politically, or only morally and informally. In most anti-colonial struggles, visions of social rights were important, but civil and political rights tended to be prioritised. When the emancipatory struggles ended, social rights were typically neglected and, as in India, recent attempts to move ahead have often been through judicial action (Jayal 2013, Chandhoke 2016). The Indian state of Kerala is once again a good illustration of a more consistent trend. During the late 19th and early 20th century, many of the socio-religious reform movements among different castes and religious communities understood the importance of advocating *equal* civil, political, and social rights to improve their bargaining power. Thanks to the additional influence of new socialist perspectives, they thus laid the foundations for Kerala's unique democratic politics and human development (Harriss and Törnquist 2016). Meanwhile, citizenship rights suffered in the context of 'politics of order', even though state-socialists tried to do as well as Cuba in terms of social rights. By contrast, social rights were often neglected during the third wave of democracy. In the new context of globalised uneven development with growing inequalities and conflicts, however, dominant and aspiring actors have come to pay new attention to the issues of social rights and welfare reforms. This is a core finding of a recent survey of the status of democracy in Indonesia (Törnquist et al. 2017) and also a core theme in the case studies of citizenship politics presented in this book.

The discussion in the rest of this chapter will be divided into two main sections. The first section (with Törnquist as the lead author) will outline the historical development of citizenship and struggles across different regimes. The emphasis here is on the key actors and

agendas in the history of citizenship politics in Indonesia, and how this has produced distinct regimes of citizenship and citizenship politics in different periods. We identify six politics of citizenship regimes: (i) the colonial regime until the mid-1940s; (ii) the rise and fall of citizenship, popular organisation, and democracy until 1957; (iii) the 'Guided Democracy' regime until late 1965; (iv) the politics of 'New Order' until mid-1998; (v) elitist democracy and decentralisation until the late 2000's, and (vi) populist transactionalism in the current period. The second section (with Hiariej as the lead author) provides a further analytical examination of these regimes and periods by focusing on the specificities and shifting balance of three dimensions in the historical struggle for citizenship: (i) nationalism and the politics of recognition; (ii) struggle for social justice; and (iii) democracy and politics of representation.

Indonesia's Six Politics of Citizenship Regimes

The starting period for Indonesia's politics of citizenship was the early 20th century, during the blossoming of modern Independence movements. In the preceding three decades, the archipelago had already witnessed struggles by traditional regimes against the conquest of Dutch colonialism in many different places. These struggles took the shape of wars direct and indirect against colonial rule; essentially, there was a rejection of having to be a colonial subject. The specific issues of contention were many, ranging from land occupation and forced cropping to unfair trade and labour exploitation. By the end of the Aceh War in the early 1900s, the process of turning the residents of the archipelago into colonial subjects was largely complete. At the same time, modern independence movements came into being. These movements were basically shaped by various forms of struggle for citizenship, focusing on issues of cultural recognition, social justice, and popular representation. They rejected the traditional nobilities that had been subordinated to the colonial regime during the first wave of resistance. Moreover, the new movements were modern as they relied more on modern

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organisation and based themselves on 'Indonesia' as a new imagined nation, inclusive of all ethnic groups, religions, and islands within the Netherland East Indies. The end of colonialism introduced a modern nation-state model of citizenship. The struggles for citizenship were not complete with Indonesia's independence in the late 1940s, however, given that the sovereign state of Indonesia was mostly deracialised but far from democratised.

(I) The colonial regime and its critics

The modern independence movements grew strong in the early 20th century (see, for example, Ricklef 2008; Teeuw 1984; Onghokham 2014). They turned against colonialism, racism, and indirect rule in particular, arguing for civil and political rights as well as social equity for all—albeit often excepting the Chinese minority, that was accused of serving as colonial middlemen. Most of these organisations were led by intellectuals and aspiring Indonesian entrepreneurs. Their main roots were in progressive sections of Muslim and other religious organisations. These were rooted in society rather than the old regimes, in contrast to South Asia and the Middle East. There were also ethnic-based associations and secular communities. These movements' major priorities included self-help business and welfare schemes, as well as also popular oriented education and the promotion of *Bahasa Indonesia* as a lingua franca. The idea of an independent and unified yet multi-cultural modern nation state was widely supported, including outside Java. Radical socialists and communists added social equality, primarily including land reform but also trade union rights and the nationalisation of foreign companies towards workers' control. Though they did not fight the ethnic Chinese in general, they targeted various practices of usury that derogatively were associated solely with the Chinese.

Radicalism increased as the Japanese invaders did away with the Dutch hegemony in the early 1940s, and when the Dutch later tried to regain their positions with the support of the British (see, for example, Anderson 1972/2006; Cribb 1991/2008). The new Republic's proud declaration of independence in August 1945, emphasising religious and ethnic pluralism, political and civil rights, and social justice (such as the reclaiming of land forcefully cultivated with sugar) was soon overtaken by fierce revolutionary struggles that did not always conform to stated honourable principles. The fierce struggles were not only because the Dutch were thoroughly disliked, but also because the president and parliamentary leaders were quite dependent on various autonomous militia forces. Finally, the leftists among the militias were defeated and subordinated to their rivals and new Western-oriented leaders of the Republic, as part of an understanding with the Netherlands and its allies.

(II) The rise and fall of citizenship, popular organisation, and democracy

Once the leftists were marginalised and the Dutch had to accept that Indonesia would be free, The Hague fostered a federative constitution to contain other radicals and sustain its influence through old partners from its indirect colonial rule. This proved counterproductive. The new battle line became one of central versus decentralised governance. Even a genuine Indonesian version of federalism became politically impossible. Politicians in favour of a unitary constitution and strong leadership gained increasing support within the broader nationalist movement.

Initially, the restored parliamentary democracy of 1946 fostered fruitful competition and compromises. This framework included full civil and political rights, as well as visions of social justice. As such, the aspirations that had been fundamental in the struggle for liberation were returned to the forefront along with modern progressive citizenship and class-driven

movements. This was how the worlds' largest democratically oriented popular movement came into being, based on sectoral organisations among workers, peasants, informal labour, youths, students, artists, and many others, perhaps particularly impressively women fighting for gender equality. The most dynamic of these movements was led by the growing PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia* or Indonesian Communist Party).[4] The party had turned reformist by the early 1950s and benefitted from the patronage of the populist President Soekarno, who in return received even wider popular support. Though Soekarno avoided the language of class, he spoke up against western imperialism in favour of the common people (*orang kecil*) and small producers who did not exploit anyone (*marhaenism*). Most other civil and popular organisations were based on patronage and elitist networks, often in addition to ethnic and religious solidarities. The competition was intense but mostly non-violent, and the political importance of interests, ideas, and rights increased. The development of equal citizenship and democracy seemed feasible.

In the context of the cold war, however, the conflicts over central versus local governance, the degrees of civil and social rights, the demands for land reform, and the nationalisation of foreign companies became more uncompromising. Following the inconclusive results of the impressive parliamentary elections in 1955, the communist victory in the local elections in 1957, and the nationalisation of Dutch companies in 1957 (to mobilise popular support and put pressure on the Netherlands to give up West Papua, regrettably in favour of Indonesian dominance), critics of centralist rule rejected the government and President Soekarno. This rejection and subsequent rebellions gained active support from the West. The tragic end-result was that President Soekarno and the central military leaders—with the support of both the mainstream nationalist parties and the communists—declared martial law in the entire country and scrapped parliamentary democracy in favour of a so-called 'Guided Democracy'.

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[4] For the role of the PKI until 1966, see Törnquist 1984/2011.

(III) The Short Period of 'Guided Democracy'

As Soekarno introduced 'Guided Democracy', he claimed it to be more suitable to the Indonesian socio-cultural context than liberal-parliamentary democracy. In reality, 'Guided Democracy' did away with full civil and political rights, elections, and parliamentary democracy in favour of a strong presidency and military, along with their interpretation of the five principles of the Republic, that is, the state ideology *Pancasila* as well as 'the needs of the people'. Nationalism turned centrist and top-down constructed. Participation was in terms of (i) 'negotiated' political representation of supportive parties while 'the others' were constrained or prohibited, and (ii) state-corporatism in terms of top-down-appointed representatives of so-called functional groups, such as the military, peasants, workers, women, and minorities. (See, for example, Lev 1966/2009)

The regime rested with a strange combination of actors with common interests in centralised governance and politically facilitated development. Some had leftist ideas of transformative reforms, others sought support for traditional Muslim schools and values, yet others wanted 'strong state and leadership' and to resist the communists that would most likely have won the general elections that were scheduled for 1959. These groups, especially those in favour of stronger leadership, abused political favours and resources, while military leaders became economically independent by assuming control of nationalised companies. Ironically, moral support for this primitive accumulation of capital came from the East. The communists, who began to drift towards Beijing, opposed so-called bureaucratic capitalism, but without acknowledging the political rise of capitalism in the context of the very alliance that they themselves endorsed. Moreover, it was difficult for the PKI to break out of the alliance without being subject to repression, as it could no longer rely on victories in elections. Outright opposition and efforts at rebellion came instead from private entrepreneurs within

natural resource-based businesses and modern-Muslim socio-religious organisations, Singapore-oriented 'social democrats', and liberal-oriented students and intellectuals; all had active support from the West. At the same time, however, these actors were not prepared to defend liberal democracy, as the communists would most likely have won any free and fair elections. In any case, dissidents' civil and political rights were restricted and at times repressed. The regime propagated instead social rights, to be promoted by land reform and State control of natural resources. However, the military took command of these resources and land reform was contained by resistance within the Soekarno-led alliance, including in the villages. Finally, abusive rent-seeking and primitive accumulation of capital undermined all efforts at independent economic development, generating in the early 1960s a deep economic crisis that was exacerbated by severe drought.

(IV) The politics of 'New Order' and its discontents

General Soeharto's rise to power in late 1965 was made possible by the covert attempt of a few leftist officers' and communist leaders' to get out of the stalemate by kidnapping prime enemy generals, accusing them of treason, and appointing a revolutionary council in support of the President. This tactic failed; the generals were killed or escaped. These actions were used as a scapegoat for a militarily, politically, and religiously instigated massacre of more than 500,000 people, as well as the elimination of the world's largest popular movement of innumerable radical nationalists and almost 20 million reform-oriented communists and organised sympathisers (1/5 of Indonesia's contemporary population). This regime transition even became a blueprint for the 'middle-class coups' in the Global South (Nun 1967). These were underpinned by Samuel Huntington's theory about the need for 'politics of order', i.e. strong political institutions in cases where the middle classes were too weak to win elections

and to withstand popular dissatisfaction in the process of capitalist modernisation (Huntington 1965).

The regime transition contain several paradoxes: First, Soeharto's new politics of order had gained ground within the centrally imposed Guided Democracy that had enabled the coercively and politically facilitated accumulation of resources. Second, the communists and radical nationalists had unintentionally paved the way for a repressive political rise of capitalism. Third, liberal- and Singapore-oriented students and middle class activists who supported the military against the communists and Soekarno, and looked forward to freedoms and leading positions with military assistance, instead became technocratic assistants of the officers and their cronies and big international investors.

All analysts agreed, therefore, that there were no longer any preconditions for either liberal welfarism or social democratic-oriented development. Nevertheless, research informing this chapter suggested that there was new potential for broad alliances in favour of equal citizen rights and democracy. This was both for normative reasons as well as preconditions for fighting the dictatorial primitive accumulation and promoting more inclusive development. (Törnquist 1984a) In this view, the main question was whether and how such a movement could emerge and, if so, what interests and long-term perspectives would gain the upper hand.

From the mid-1980s, there were signs of more extensive resistance against the politically facilitated accumulation of capital among farmers and labourers, as well as among businessmen and professionals that lacked privileged access. However, the level of organisation remained poor. Radicals suggested democratisation of the State and politics. Most groups, however, wanted to dismantle the State and politics in general as it was repressive and corrupt, as the dissidents did not have any mass base, and as the 'masses' were anyway deemed uneducated. As such, the focus was on human rights and anti-corruption, enlightened citizen organisations, and economic liberalisation. As such, even though the

demand for democracy became a unifying slogan of the 1990s, it was advocated less by ordinary people than by students and intellectuals, especially dissenting lecturers, journalists, artists, and lawyers, and their demands were more about freedom than equal citizenship, collective action, and governance. Meanwhile, by mid-1996 it was clear that soft-liners in favour of reforming the regime from within had failed.

Hence, the New Order was never defeated or even reformed by popular forces. It crumbled in the face of scattered discontent and the inability of despotic leaders who had fostered so much privatisation that they could no longer handle an economic crisis like that which affected East and South East Asia in 1997–98. This reduced, finally, the support of many relatively privileged middle classes as well as businessmen, several politicians, and even officers. However, nobody within the mainstream—inside or outside the country—dared tip the balance. Only pro-democratic activists did.

(V) Elitist democracy and decentralisation

Most pro-democrats wanted a transitional government to foster citizenship, popular organisation, and participatory and more decentralised governance, and to pave the way for genuine democracy. They lost out within a few months. Mainstream regime critics like Megawati Soekarnoputri, Amien Rais, and Abdurrahman Wahid—on top of organisations that had survived the New Order—agreed with moderates within the old regime on liberties, decentralisation, and quick elections. They were advised by mainstream international scholars and by their Indonesian colleagues on democratisation. The implication was that the poorly organised pro-democrats were placed offside and fell on the roadside. The moderates' idea was that major leaders, including from the New Order, would turn democratic by adjusting to

liberal democratic institutions while the pro-democrats would join the mainstream or propel change from positions in civil society.

This strategy has generated remarkable freedoms and stability, but governance and representation have remained poor. As concluded in recent democracy surveys conducted with pro-democracy experts, the main causes are not only the vested interests of the old actors but also the biased institutions of representation and actors' poor capacity for change (Törnquist et al. 2017). These dynamics are in the context of a sharp turn from the centrally defined nationalism that dominated Indonesia during 'Guided Democracy' and the New Order to the more plural multi-culturalist characteristics during the rise and fall of citizenship, popular organisation, and democracy until 1957. However, contemporary pluralism remains constrained by religious sectarianism and reluctance on part of the government and militant Muslims—in the military in particular—to come to terms with old and new offences of human rights. Governance, too, has been radically altered, with general shifts: (i) from centralist state-ism to decentralised rule; (ii) from centrally appointed military leaders and top civil servants to elected politicians and political executives; (iii) from state-corporatism and cronyism to lobbying and networking by oligarchs as well as activists, and; (iv) from, military repression of regional revolts and religious conflicts to the co-option of dissenting leaders into rewarding politics and attractive business. Abusive rent-seeking, including corruption, are very much part of these 'solutions'. Even anti-corruption activists who are short of mandates in and accountability to principled professional associations and democratic organisations are, at times, co-opted into the abusive system.

More generally, the development of active citizenship is constrained by people being short of their own supportive organisations. There have been constant efforts to bring together various

groups. However, on top of ideological and personal conflicts, the already existing organisations and movements have focused on 'their own' projects and the most rewarding ways of reaching their immediate aims, such as by personal access to influential leaders rather than membership-based organisation for public policy reforms. Even international democracy support has fostered the implementation of specific projects according to neo-liberal new public management ideas rather than public institutions and long-term organisational principles that would make broad collective and strategic action more rational. As such, new civil and political rights tend to be claimed via traditional leaders or market-based intermediaries rather than the support of people's own organisations and advisers. The same applies to the impressive new social right to public health. Vulnerable people are short of capacity to get access to the new services individually or with the assistance of their own organisations. In-spite of advances, moreover, much welfare is still provided through self-help, communal, and socio-religious organisations. In addition, struggles for civil and political rights have often been separated from social rights. Labour rights in particular, especially among informal labour, are neglected. This is despite more active labour organisations. An important reason why it is difficult for their members and leaders to advance beyond struggles for better wages is the lack of a democratic institutional framework to negotiate social rights (including within working life), welfare, and related issues with business and the State.

(VI) Transactional populism

From the late 2000s, elitist democracy turned increasingly populist. Transactional horse-trading, rent-seeking, and informal personal contacts remained crucial, but the new direct elections of political executives, with increasing powers and decentralised public resources, meant that successful candidates have had to go beyond elitist parties and specific patron-client relations. In other words, there is a need to reach out to wider sections of the population

with appealing visions through media, attractive figures, and civil and popular organisations, ranging from unions and informal labourers' groups to campaigners against corruption, environmental destruction, and gender biases. Moreover, the severe effects of the Asian economic crisis, along with rapid urbanisation and neo-liberalisation of the economy and labour relations, means that politicians must turn popular discontent into votes through broad welfare measures. Similarly, union leaders must consider alliances with subcontracted workers and informal labour to sustain their bargaining power.

The new top-down populism is certainly no panacea for a progressive politics of citizenship. On the contrary, for example, it was so skilfully applied by the authoritarian oligarch Prabowo Subianto (former general and son-in-law of President Soeharto) that he almost 'made a Donald Trump' in the 2014 presidential elections by using immense economic resources and extensive media control to bring together reactionary and nationalist sentiments with discontent among marginalised sections of the population. More recently, populism has also been combined with religious and moralistic identity politics. The main drawbacks of populism include sweeping definitions of 'the people' (neglecting class differences in particular) and undemocratic direct relations between leaders and supporters.

However, structural changes and populism have created new opportunities for civil activists and popular movements that could provide support in return for policies and favours. This, in turn, could at best support collective action towards equal citizenship rights. This book is largely about the problems, options, and lessons along different frontlines within this new opportunity structure.

Struggles for citizenship

The argument of this chapter is that citizenship is political. It is produced and constituted through social practices, tensions, and conflicts. Its formation is largely shaped by power struggles between dominant groups and individuals vis-à-vis civil society and popular sector-based movements and activists. In the name of maintaining power, the former hold and control citizenship formation. They also stabilise the process through the instalment of relevant rules and regulations aimed at regulating and institutionalising class struggles. The latter has always been the backbone of social and political forces that advance citizenship practices and claims. Historically, they have been a combination of scattered movements and concerted actions rallying for cultural recognition, social justice, and popular representation. In the following section, the discussion will unfold briefly the development of each of these struggles through the six regimes previously outlined.

Nationalism and the politics of recognition

As previously noted, in the early days of citizenship struggles the politics of recognition was closely associated with modern nationalist movements (see, for example, Ricklefs 2008; Vieke 1961; Onghokham 2014). However, since the very first day the movements had to deal with the question of nation, that is, what kind of shared cultural community must be recognised to overcome racial abuses. Such questions led to different imaginations of the future community of the nation. One group of activists dreamed of the formation of a large Indonesian ethnic, comprising all ethnic and race-based groups residing within the Archipelago. Pioneered by such elites as the organistion Budi Utomo, the idea was that the term Indonesia had to denote culturally similar indigenous people living in the Netherlands East Indies area. The oneness, they argued, should be built around ideas of ethnic and racial solidarity, religious affiliation, and/or geographical proximity. The other group also imagined a nation that was culturally bond, but placed more emphasis on the shared goals of being a

free and independent nation that aspires to be an advanced and prosperous country through development and modernisation. This rather secular and less primordial sense of community built solidarity on the basis of shared experiences of colonial subjection. The motivation to become a nation did not originate from old cultural-ethnic ties, but the creation of a modern world based on the idea of progress. As eloquently put by Tjipto Mangunkusomo from the Indische Partij (IP) in 1912 (quoted in Elson 2005: 149):

"It is a corollary, to be neither escaped nor prevented, that thereby all the people of the Indies archipelago will have to set aside what is peculiar to them, just as the Friesians have to do to be part of the Dutch political unity, and the Bavarians theirs in order to feel happy in the German state… *Sembah* and *dodok* [paying traditional obeisance] gradually become antiquarian, increasingly seldom displayed to the foreigner."

These different attempts to imagine and build a national community actually accentuated the intriguing multi-cultural nature of the future Indonesia (see Robinson 2014). Despite discursive enterprises by prominent figures such as Soekarno to reinvent and reclaim Hindu Kingdoms such as Sriwijaya and Majapahit as predecessors of an Indonesian nation, whose historical development was fatally interrupted by the Dutch colonialism, Acehnese, Javanese, Balinese, Timorese, Papuans, etc. existed in and of themselves. It was the colonial rulers that united them into one polity, economy, and society. It made a lot of sense that Malays in the Philippines, Malaka strait, and peninsula had never been part of this imagined nation, for they were geographically located outside the territory of the Netherlands East Indies. More importantly, however, as Dutch colonialism was the only uniting force, the residents of the

archipelago had then to find a reason for living together in one nation. Unsurprisingly, since the very beginning the politics of recognition had to deal with the question of how to build a national community based on diverse ethnic identities. The key question was how such a nation could be established without jeopardising the peculiarity and uniqueness attached to each ethnic group.

Shortly before and after Indonesia's independence, these questions were behind heated debates on the form of the nation-state (see Kusuma 2004; Asshiddiqie 2007; Kahin 1952). On the one hand were the unitary-cum-integralistic arguments, holding that Indonesia and its community should be treated as one big family. The state is the father, who will wisely and carefully look after the welfare and security of each member (ethnic group) of the big (ethnic Indonesian) family; fairly recognise each of them; and govern the way they relate to each other. For their part, each member of the family is required to pay loyalty to the state; eagerly contribute to collective lives; and, through this, enrich the beauty of an Indonesian unity of different colours. They should put general interests—defined unilaterally by the "father"—above particular concerns. On the other hand were the federalist arguments, which held that Indonesia is hardly a big family, in which the state acts like a father and ensures that the peculiarity and uniqueness of diverse ethnic groups are recognised and fairly treated. Each ethnic group should instead be allowed to have (relative) autonomy in preserving its unique way of living. The nation is more like a salad bowl, with cultural diversity as its main feature. These diverse cultures were to be connected by a shared ideal imagination of a future modern and prosperous Indonesia and by pragmatic arrangements such as relying on the same regulatory framework, economic interdependence, and shared language.

This debate dominated the politics of recognition in the first decade after Independence. In the late 1950s, the unitary arguments gained the upper hand, and over the next almost four decades the construction of the national community was a top-down process, forged by the State's propaganda that combined celebration of the beauty of cultural diversity with fear of ethnic tension that "Balkanise" the country. However, as the centralised nature of the unitary form of government tended to marginalise and exclude local communities, this hardly prevented local uprisings, some of which ended up as separatist movements (see Amal 1992). The debate resumed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, following Soeharto's resignation. The idea of federalism was once again the second best, and the country continued to live under unitary-cum-integralistic imagery. While separatist movements remained strong in Papua, a more moderate and tame form of local uprising struggling for cultural recognition took the shape of "son of the soil" campaigns and the formation of multiple new regional governments. It started with the decentralisation policy, one which dealt partly with the importance of recognizing cultural uniqueness through local political processes. The policy opened up the space for the politics of recognition, centred around the rights of native residents in a given regional administration to have better access to various government and public offices. The son of the soil campaigns were meant to defend and promote this right, a view largely justified after the so-called native were marginalised during almost three decades of New Order rule. Among specific ethnic groups, the same policy also gave rise to new consciousness of having separate cultural identities within existing regional administrations. In several places of the country, this growing consciousness led to the fight for, and then formation of, new regional governments.

It is important to note that Indonesia is also the home of many different religions. The question of religion became an important part of the politics of recognition as early as a few

years before independence, predominantly involving a plea by Muslim groups and individuals for Islam to take a greater role in the country's state and nation building (Hefner 2000; Kuntowijoyo 1994; Noer 1973). Indeed, as previously indicated, the roots of modern independence movements were in progressive Muslim groups—and other religious organisations too. In its radical strands, the plea took the form of ideological struggles to establish an Islamic state and implement *Shari'a*—a sort of Islamic way of life. The most radical actors were even willing to use violence and wage war in fighting for their goals. For less radical Muslims, the Islamic state and the implementation of *Shari'a* could be achieved through peaceful and institutional means. Becoming involved in power struggles within existing institutionalised and legitimate political processes was perceived as being more strategic. This was the path taken by PK (*Partai Keadilan* or Justice Party), which later became PKS (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* or Prosperous Justice Party) in the early 2000s. The party decided to work within democratic rules and even promoted some forms of popular representation. Yet another group of Muslim thinkers and activists believed that the best role Islam and other religions could play was to provide the country with ethically informed advice and deliberation. While political, economic, and social issues were the territory of a worldly and rational inspired decision process, Islam and other religions could be the source of ethical considerations in the nation's mind and soul. More importantly, this kind of religious plea paved the way for the emergence of various struggles that challenged Islam's— particularly as understood by radicals—larger role in state and nation formation. These challenges, coming not only from non-Islamic religions but also from Muslims that advocated different interpretations of Islamic teachings, refused to be excluded and marginalised by the Islamic mainstream. This has frequently led to tension and conflict, sometimes involving the use of various types of violence at different scales and magnitude.

Recently, the politics of recognition has entered a slightly different phase. For years the construction of Indonesia as a nation for those residing in the archipelago was preoccupied with how to include and recognise diverse ethnicities and religions in one shared community. Since the early 2000s, the country had witnessed the emergence of identity politics based on gender, sexual orientation, age, lifestyle, religiosity, indigeneity, etc. Their struggles were not a claim to be Indonesian per se, but more about the domination of categories such as ethnicity, religion, and/or class as the basis for constructing the national community. Struggles for local customs and customary rights are within this new trend of cultural recognition politics. Having emerged from the New Order's massive development programs around three decades earlier, the movements—as discussed in one of the studies in this book—combined demands for recognition with struggles for social justice as well as concerns about environmental degradation. Nevertheless, the same movements could potentially be detrimental to democracy as they essentialise—and hence prioritise—native residents over non-native ones. Even worse, the preoccupation with local customs has often allowed local elites to mobilise support using primordial ties at the expense of local ordinary people's interests. This points to a tension between the universalising tendencies of nation-building and particularistic identity politics that have, in changing ways, been at the core of the politics of recognition in Indonesia. It also highlights how such contentious questions about the construction of communities of citizens are also closely linked to politics of redistribution (social justice) and political representation.

The struggles for social justice

The rise of independence movements in the early 20th century, as mentioned before, was not only about the politics of recognition. Strongly attached to nationalism were struggles against the social and economic injustice suffered by the majority of colonial subjects due to the

activities of the colonial Dutch, Asian settler merchants, and small groups of indigenous comprador elites. To expand the analysis in the first section, it should be noted that there were divisions within these struggles. Activists from organisations such as Muhammadiyah and Sarekat Islam (SI) held the opinion that injustice is closely related to underdevelopment, as reflected, for example, in limited access to education and health care. This underdevelopment produced a low quality of life for most colonial subjects, who further suffered from what they portrayed as 'backwardness'. The latter was associated with the habit of maintaining traditional and feudalistic ways of living, such as believing in superstition and complying with feudalist cultural hierarchies and manners. Rarely viewing itself as being against the colonial rulers, Muhammadiyah tried to fight injustice by opening schools and hospitals, publishing newspapers, and publicly denouncing old traditions (Fiederspiel 1970; Peacock 1986). In the late 1910s, the leader of SI, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, believed that progress could be achieved by cooperating with the colonial government (Siraishi 1997).

A different view was held by organisations such as IP, PKI, and Insulinde. Also concerned with social and economic inequality, they pointed at colonialism as the main factor contributing to underdevelopment. Through colonialism, the Dutch exploited the natural and human resources in the Netherland East Indies area, while the majority of natives residing in the archipelago were left with poverty and misery. Strongly influenced by the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Semaun (1966) from PKI argued that such exploitation was part of the global development of capitalism at that time, especially after the colonial government's policy to open up its territory for international investments. In this sense, and in stark contrast to the other strand above, struggling for social justice meant nothing less than fighting against colonialism. They were thus critical of the positions taken by Muhammadiyah and SI,

accusing both organisations of being influenced by conservatives such as merchants, petite bourgeoisie, pious Muslims, and noble families.

In the late 1920s, the second view was gaining ascendance as fighting against colonialism was widely taken as a prerequisite for development and progress and, hence, the future of social justice. By then, however, a new division came to the fore, one between social revolution idealists and those who emphasised the primacy of national revolution. For social revolutionists such as Semaun, colonialism was just another form of capitalism (see McVey 1965/2006). A social justice transformation required not only the abolition of colonialism, but also—and more importantly—radical changes in capitalist production relations. The enemies were both the colonial government and the capitalist class. Only socialist movements, argued Semaun (1966), could transform the archipelago into a modern state that protects the poor and proletariats with fair and just income distribution. Sjahrir from PSI (*Partai Sosialis Indonesia* or Indonesian Socialist Party) opposed this idea. Social revolution made no sense as the capitalists were the Dutch and the Asian settler merchants. Therefore, according to Mohammad Hatta from PI (*Perhimpunan Indonesia* or Indonesian Association), national revolution must be prioritised and should not be contaminated with the idea of social revolution (Kahin 1952).

This heated debate was hardly toned down after independence. Another leading PKI figure, Musso (1953), accused the so-called national bourgeoisie of hijacking independence struggles and isolating the national revolution from the increasing proletariat revolution across the globe. Nationalism was perceived as a bourgeois ideology masking inequality and exploitation. In the late 1950s, Soekarno gave a speech titled "Menemukan Kembali Revolusi

Kita" (Rediscovering Our Revolution). His speech was to argue that the country was entering a third state of revolution, one against capitalism and imperialism. This was the stage of social and economic revolution that would allow the Indonesian people to achieve the promise of independence struggles, that is, a just, prosperous life free from misery (Kaligis 2014). A younger generation of PKI activists, such as D. N. Aidit (1964), echoed similar sentiments by emphasising that, as the task was not only fighting foreign capital, but also local landlords and comprador capitalists, the Indonesian revolution had yet to be completed. In partial contrast to Semaun and Musso's arguments, the new PKI leaders claimed that workers had to abstain from demands for socialism in favour of building the broadest possible front against landlords, imperialists, and their Indonesian compradors (see Mortimer 1974/2006). The debate was suddenly muted after the above-mentioned failed attempt in 1965 to sideline conservative military leaders. Soekarno was marginalised and removed from his presidential post. PKI was disbanded and social revolution was treated as a dangerous ideology.

In the late 1960s, struggles for social justice began entering a different phase. Thanks to oil windfall, the new regime was largely successful in pursuing economic growth and prosperity. The promise of independence seemed to be delivered and social revolution looked antiquated. However, the economic fortune failed to trickle down as promised by its proponents and signs of social unrests were reported as early as the first half of 1970s. During times of crisis, such as those of the 1980s oil crisis and 1990s monetary crisis, social inequality turned from bad to worse. Those who rarely enjoyed the pie of economic development were hit hardest.

At the same time, the seeds of social revolution proved hard to crush. Focusing more on resisting the social and economic inequality produced by New Order's economic

development, it reappeared in at least two different forms. In the beginning, pioneered by groups of student activists such as KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* or the United Action of Indonesian Student), inequality was commonly denounced as morally unacceptable. Departing from the structural analysis in the previous period, students and like-minded activists blamed corruption and other immoral behaviour by state officials, who were using their power to enrich themselves at the expense of the people. They were less organised, lacked connections to grass-root communities, and tended to rely on support from the existing political elite. The students also perceived themselves as belonging to the moral power and were ready to work hand-in-hand with the government to correct immoral behaviours and put the country back on the right track.

A significant change started in the mid-1980s. Marked by the protest against the building of a dam in Kedungombo, Central Java, a new wave of struggles for social justice abandoned the old language of morality (Lane 2014). Structural analysis returned as activists condemned the capitalist development pursued by New Order and the roles of international and domestic capitalists in creating poverty and misery. By this point, the NGO activists, journalists, dissenting academicians, students, workers, and peasants who launched various protests were more organised. They distanced themselves from the government and political elite and were willing to mobilise people at the grass-roots, using the 'people power' in the Philippines as inspiration. The movements were getting strong in the 1990s. However, as previously indicated, the lack of capacity to launch and maintain concerted actions contributed to disarray following Soeharto's resignation in 1998. The struggles for social justice seemed to have lost momentum. Despite the economic crises that lead to the resignation, the euphoria of political freedom after Soeharto's fall set aside social justice and welfare issues. The struggles resumed shortly and took various forms. In general, in the mid-2000s, the country

experienced a significant increase in public concerns on welfare related issues, ranging from daily needs and fuel prices, healthcare and educational services, to housing and the quality of public transportation (Savirani and Törnquist 2015). Nevertheless, the populist elite discussed in the first part of this chapter rarely framed welfare related policies as part of major structural transformation aimed at resource redistribution along class lines. They instead acted more like benevolent leaders who feel morally responsible for improving the welfare of the people. A less moralistic and more transformative approach was taken by a number of collective actions led by various popular sector-based activists and movements. These actions succeeded in forcing the government to issue a universal welfare scheme policy. Actions were, however, short-lived. Once again, lack of capacity for durable and strategic concerted actions prevented a meaningful social justice transformation from becoming reality.

Democracy and the politics of representation

Dutch colonialism in Indonesia was based on two main activities (in addition to the earlier analysis): economic exploitation and politics of order to ensure and protect economic exploitation (Furnivall 1967/2010; Booth 1998; Cribb 1994). As a result, apart from a small number of local elite who worked as colonial administrators and whose privilege was also part of the remaining feudalist cultural hierarchy, the majority of colonial subjects were denied political freedom and rights to participate in government. They were controlled and exploited for the interests of Dutch colonialism. In the first two decades of 20th century, this led to struggles focusing on two issues: rights of association and popular representation (Noer 1986). At the same time, the growing prominence of liberalism in the Netherlands persuaded many politicians to force their government to pursue so-called "ethic politics", that is, a policy to recompense the hardship suffered by the colonial subjects in the Netherlands East Indies. Such developments seemed to have succeeded in persuading the colonial government to allow

limited freedom. The formation of organisations such as IP, Budi Utomo, SI, and Muhammadiyah was permitted, as well as various forms of social and political gatherings. The government was, however, ready to take drastic measures should this association endanger its power. IP, for instance, suffered from such measures; the organisation was later disbanded and its key members were forced into exile.

The same developments also paved the way for the government in the Netherlands to issue policies to decentralise power from The Hague to then-Batavia (present-day Jakarta), from Batavia to other regions, and from the Dutch to the native residents of the Netherland East Indies (Ricklefs 2008). The government then introduced several city councils. Though dominated by the Dutch settlers, the councils were open to participation by local natives—but only those who were literate and paid the highest income tax. This was followed by the formation of *Volksraad* (People's Council) whose members were selected from city councils and appointed by the General Governor. For their part, activists in independence movements used this opportunity to increase their demands for popular representation. Tjokroaminoto, who was a member of *Volksraad*, issued a motion (Noer 1986; Onghokham 2014) demanding universal suffrage for colonial subjects, parliament with legislative rights, and parliament that holds the highest power and controls the government. Another *Volksraad* member, Sutarjo, issued a petition and demanded that the government transform the *Volksraad* into a real parliament and form a *Rijksraad* (state council), with an appointed chairman, whose members consisted of Dutch and natives of the Netherland East Indies. However, these efforts was never substantiated in real changes, as those councils were more of a strategy by the colonial government to institutionalise struggles for independence.

Following independence, struggles for democracy and popular representation were largely dominated by debate on the best form of government to ensure the sovereignty of the people. Key figures, such as Sjahrir and Amir Syarifudin, rejected the decision made earlier by the PPKI (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia* or Preparation Committee for the Independence of Indonesia) to form a political system based on a single party and a presidential ministerial cabinet. Were this decision to be implemented, the newly independent Indonesia would replicate Japan's totalitarian system. Instead, they belonged to the camp that advocated a parliamentary system. To settle the matter, Hatta, by then the vice president, issued Declaration Number X to change the form of government from a presidential to parliamentary system; and another declaration to support the establishment of political parties.

Soekarno and others opposed the parliamentary system. Soekarno argued for a form of democracy more suitable to an Indonesian socio-cultural context, which, he believed, should emphasise the importance of agreement reached through a deliberation process led by the elders. In a homology with the unitary-cum-integralistic argument previously discussed, the unity of the nation with the State as the leading father of a big Indonesian family was put above liberalism, which was commonly denounced for having the potential to create division along ethnic and cultural lines. Soekarno did act and behave like a father to all Indonesian people. He increasingly became the most dominant power and tried to substantiate his ideas through the so-called Guided Democracy, discussed earlier. The rise of the New Order finalised the process initiated by Soekarno and his Guided Democracy, as the new power coalition introduced state corporatism and a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime (Mas'oed 1989). More importantly, the rise of the New Order paved the way for a new wave of struggles for democracy and popular representation. These struggles, unlike those of previous periods, were no longer dominated by the elite. Civil society- and popular sector-based

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movements and activists increasingly took centre stage. Supported by the economic crisis, they were also at the forefront in forcing Soeharto to step down in the late 1990s.

In the beginning of the New Order period, the struggles denounced political corruption and the authoritarian nature of the regime. After the late 1980s, the struggles grew stronger and wider as the increasing popular sectors joined the actions to demand more freedom and democracy. The fall of Soeharto was followed by a process of democratisation. At the heart of this process was the introduction of rules and regulations relevant for the advancement of civil and political freedom as well as popular representation. This was supported by an alliance of moderate elites who tried to protect the instalment of rules and regulation from the infringement of non-elite based actions. However, as previously indicated, the apparent success story of democracy was instead characterised by stagnation. The majority of people, especially those at the grass-roots level, failed to make use of the new institutions to advance their interests. Ironically, these supposedly democratic institutions tended to serve only the interests of oligarchic groups and individuals. The progress of the democratisation process was then largely arrested by the interests of those who benefited the most from its current stage of development and by those who still clung strongly to the institutionalist-cum-liberalist approach.

The struggles were supposedly entering a different phase, with a focus on overcoming the problems of weak popular representation. However, the situation was hardly promising. The majority of civil society- and popular sector-based movements and activists opted to bypass the problems. They tended to rely on strategies detrimental to popular representation, such as

a combination of populism and distributing patronage; lobbying and clientelistic networks to access state resources; and media popularity to increase political leverage.

Conclusion

The struggle for civil and political rights in primarily Muslim-oriented Indonesia was not as rooted in political and statist projects as in the Middle East. Rather, the citizenship struggle grew more out of different and at times overlapping societal collectivities with roots in religion, ethnicity, and class. Moreover, the prime objective was the rejection of oppressive old rulers and colonialism in all its forms. Though there were certainly contradictions, such as over the role of both religion and armed forces in state and politics, as well as over the relative importance of central versus local governance, by the mid-1950s it seemed possible to combine multiculturalism with universal and equal civil and political rights. Many people built their own, often remarkably progressive, organisations to this effect. Their efforts were destroyed, however, with the Cold War and the Guided Democracy. Both reduced rights and freedoms, fostered primitive accumulation of capital, and enabled political pogroms. The outcome was Soeharto's even harsher politics of centralist-authoritarian order and extractive economic development.

For more than three decades, most of the outstanding efforts at equal citizenship were thus undermined and in many respects eliminated. The counter movement for human rights and democracy, which gained strength in the early 1990s, was certainly important, but ordinary people were rarely able to build their own supportive organisations. Many principled activists were short of a social base. Only moderates could rely on socio-religious organisations and on parties that had compromised and thus survived repression under the New Order. Moreover, the post-Soeharto democratisation turned elitist, focussing on accommodating potential

spoilers of democracy among the dominating groups. The system of political representation was biased in their favour. The pro-democrats, with a focus on genuine civil and political rights, were short of political clout, and thus either co-opted or referred to lobbying, pressure politics, and civil society activity. During recent years, however, the political elite and their financiers have had to develop broader populist politics to win elections. Hence there has been some new space for popular groups and CSOs to make a difference. However, in order not to be abused and co-opted, at worst by right wing populists, the main task is still to fight for supportive organisations and alliances of their own and more fair institutions of representation. This is one of the central themes of this book.

Meanwhile struggles for social rights have, from the anti-colonial struggle and onwards, focused on altering extractive economic institutions and on favouring popular education, public governance of previous colonial companies, land reforms, decent labour laws, and more. In terms of welfare measures, self-help and support through socio-religious organisations have been more important than public programmes. This is now changing, both because of the dominant actors' need to attract voters and contain protests in the context of increasingly unbalanced neo-liberal development and because many different groups—from formal to informal labour and also middle classes with precarious employment—have begun to realise that they have more to gain from coming together for universal welfare reforms than by trying to gain special favours of their own. Such broader alliances may also foster sustainable and inclusive economic development, if combined with better civic and political representation. This is another major theme of the book.

Finally is the struggle for identity and difference. Since the early days, this struggle has taken the form of nationalism and been shaped by resistance to cultural exclusion, on the one hand, and contestation over the meaning of Indonesia, on the other. Following independence, ethnic- and religious-based movements have been the main challengers to the dominant

construction of the national community. Recently, the country also witnessed the rise of a slightly different version of identity struggles, one largely against the use of ethnicity, religion, and/or social class as the basis for defining what it means to be Indonesian. However, it is important to note that this struggle is not for the sake of identity and difference. The struggle for cultural recognition has always been closely interwoven with the claiming of civil, political, and social rights. This is also a main theme of the book.

As Ben Anderson concluded in his memoirs, we believe that, while efforts at human rights have often been individualised and dominated by hegemonic powers at their liking, 'civil rights movements which seek equal rights for the citizens of a nation cannot easily be denied by the state, and they have indeed succeeded in expanding political and socio-economic rights' (2016:195)

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