

Dynamics of Indonesian Democratisation

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DYNAMICS OF THE INDONESIAN DEMOCRATISATION, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2000; also in *Economic and Political Weekly*; april 29, 2000

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Abstract:

What are the characteristics and problems of Indonesia's democratisation? First, it is argued here, the current elite-focused approaches and recipes are insufficient. Politics is getting more localised and there is a special need to study actors and processes that may deepen democracy. Secondly, thus, the problems of attempts at popular politics of democratisation is examined. Third, this view from below is also taken as a point of departure for an analysis of the birth of the world's third largest democracy with 1999 elections, the birth of the new nation state of East Timor, the transition from Suharto's 'New Order' to Abdurrachman Whaid's (Gus Dur's) 'Pact Order'. The major current problem is the lack of democratic

institutions and especially of people's chances and capacity to develop and make use of them.

INTRODUCTION

In Europe people often say that the 20th century came to an end with the turn of the tide in Berlin 1989. In Asia it took another ten years. Here it was not state-socialism that was defeated but the West's own authoritarian growth project that imploded. Now there is another historical chance. In Indonesia, for one, the world's third largest democracy is emerging. How shall we understand its problems and dynamics? How shall we go beyond the mainstream focus on Jakarta's elitist political theatre? This is difficult. There continue to be more decisive reports in a week than previously in a year. And it is unusually hard to sort and interpret. Much of the common perspectives are subject to substantial revision. They were not very helpful in reading the unfolding of the crisis (not to talk of predicting it).

The following is instead an attempt to analyse ongoing processes on the basis of ongoing research: research about popular politics of democratisation through repeated case studies over a decade in three different contexts (Kerala, the Philippines and Indonesia).¹ The draft version of the Indonesian study was concluded just before the crack down on the democracy movement on the 27th of July, 1996.² This was when things began to change the way the research had indicated – but so fast that even though the study had to continue it was only possible to publish brief 'instant' essays.³ So before turning to the more comprehensive and time-consuming bookwriting, the following is only an attempt to summarise some of the results on the democratic struggles during the most decisive years from 1995 to 1999, *and* to use this as a point of departure for both discussing approaches to the study of the democratisation and analysing the elections and their aftermath.⁴ For presentational reasons, however, we

begin by addressing the approaches, then turn to the democratic actors, and conclude with the elections and the recent turbulent developments.

PART I:

HOW TO APPROACH INDONESIA'S DEMOCRATISATION

The new consensus on democracy isn't good enough

Till May 21, 1998, mainstream analysts claimed that Indonesia's basic problem was financial, and economic. The focus was on weak market forces, a strong state, and a weak civil society. The actions of the market and its supporters, however, proved politically disastrous, contributed to a socio-economic catastrophe, obstructed democratisation, and only accidentally helped doing away with Suharto. The economic crisis did not result from excessive state regulations (which had been there for decades) but from the combination of bad regulation and deregulation (Suharto's nepotistic monopolism and the IMF-sponsored technocrats' neo-liberalism) – and from (both parties') containment of popular influence as a basis for checks and balances.

Too late, then, – only as Suharto's own aides dumped him in face of a revolution – analysts agreed instead that the problem was political. Nothing would improve without legitimate government, which called for some democracy. With this we agreed, of course, having insisted since the mid-1996 clampdown on first Megawati and then the democracy movement in general, that a major political crisis would develop as soon as there was a triggering factor (which then happened to be financial) because Indonesia's essential dilemma was its weak regulations and its inability to handle conflicts and reform itself.⁵

Yet, I would argue, the new general consensus is not good enough. To ask for democratic governance is fine, but what of the problematic context of disintegration of Indonesia's second attempt (since colonialism) at authoritarian nation-state development? What of the socio-economic context of a crisis with some winners, many losers, and surging unemployment? What of fading trust, the rise of goon politics, and crime and violence? What of the instant general elections supported by the West, the elitist horse trade election of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) as new president, and the appointment of a conservative pact cabinet? What of the fact that while analysts suddenly realised the importance of certain aspects of democracy, there is little knowledge of what kind of democracy the various actors aim at, the problems of getting there, and what could possibly prevent failure? And what of the declining interest in the deepening of democracy to include ordinary people's capacity to make use of its institutions – now that sections of the elite have been legitimised through elections and have found a way of handling their conflicts through peaceful horse trading? So let us begin by discussing how to even approach the dynamics of the Indonesian democratisation.

Biased definitions

In Indonesia, since mid-1998, most leading actors who claim that they are serious democrats tend to agree on the universal essence of democracy in terms of freedom of speech and organisation, constitutionalism and free and fair elections – including Golkar's ex-president Habibie and then its second best Muslim alternative, the new president Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur). This is not the main problem. Within the new democracy discourse we can almost forget about Mahathir's and Lee Kuan Yew's 'Asian values' and Huntington's 'clash of civilisations'. Of course those constructs may become politically fashionable again – especially if the Indonesian

democratisation derails – but the current problem is rather that internationally reputed scholars on democracy, and so-called friendly governments and organisations, insist on the universality of more elaborated conceptualisations. What is on offer is primarily ideological packages – complete with ideals about civil society and civic virtues, special constitutional arrangements and electoral laws, technically oriented voters education, unregulated market economies and enlightened compromises – on the basis of rather self-congratulatory readings of European and especially American experiences.⁶ Indonesia, however, – with its long-standing symbiosis between strong state-based patrons and bosses and private big business in addition to weak middle- and working classes, and even weaker secular popular organising – is not the Spain or Hungary, South Africa or Chile, or the Philippines and other cases that are usually generalised from. When bad comes to worse, even bright Indonesian activist-scholars tend to forget about it, including those having backed up Megawati's and especially Amien Rais' and Gus Dur's compromises. So the trouble is no longer the question of whether or not the essential principles of democracy are universal, but the ideological neglect of the fact that application and development of these principles are always contextual and varies over time and with the social forces involved. Actual democracy changes. There is no end of history.⁷

Actors' views of democratisation

To begin with, therefore, we have to ask for the significant actors' more elaborate perspectives on democratisation. Even if they agree on many principles, they do disagree on how and what to use them for. For instance, any reasonable understanding of Indonesia's future presupposes more knowledge of why certain forms of democracy and new political institutions suddenly make sense to many of Suharto's old followers. Further, there are different views on what preconditions should be

present with regard to citizens' actual capacity to make use of democratic institutions before one is prepared to seriously bet on democracy; for example, in terms of guarantees for free and fair elections only or also substantial knowledge of political alternatives and the presence of ideologically and socially rooted parties. Finally we have the quarrels on how far democracy should extend, including the basic question of for how long and to what extent the armed forces should retain political and economic privileges. In other words: the forms of democracy, their utility, their preconditions, and their extension.

But let us not expand on this here, because there is a lack of space and it is probably even more important to know *how and in what way* the actors would like 'their' democracy to become real, i.e. how the process of democratisation should take place.

Elite manoeuvres

On surface this is well understood. Distinctions like Samuel Huntington's between the three common pathways of changing the system – of transforming it, of replacing it, or of compromising and 'transplacing' it – help us identify the triangular conflict that dominated until the recent presidential race:⁸ The catchy play, that is, among the elite between in the one corner the then president Habibie, armed forces chief Wiranto and their collaborators, who preferred 'guided democratisation' from above; in the second corner the radical students, who argued that democratisation presupposed the replacement of the incumbents; and in the third corner the dominant moderate opposition, the Ciganjur four⁹ – of pragmatic and often liberal oriented Muslim leader Abdurrachman Wahid (Gus Dur) (widely respected within the elite and with a strong mass base among rural Muslims in East and Central Java), nationalist party symbol Megawati Sukarnoputri (the daughter of the late President Sukarno), modernist and

semi-liberal Muslim leader Amien Rais (with a mass following among urban Muslims), and the incarnation of ‘the good Javanese ruler’, the Sultan of Yogyakarta – who all tried to domesticate and yet benefit from the radicals’ protests while basically focusing on negotiating and winning reasonably free and fair elections, and on then forming pragmatic coalitions and striking the best possible deal with sections of the establishment.

This, however, is very general and almost like asking for the actors’ ideal scenario of how various contending parties should behave and what the general process of democratisation should look like. So how shall we be able to go below the surface and analyse the ways in which the actors themselves really try to fight for their ideal models when confronted with the harsh realities, and really try to increase people’s ability to make use of democratic institutions when up against the resourceful elite? How shall we, in other words, analyse the actual politics of democratisation?

Of course we may try the common political science method (pioneered by scholars like O’Donnell, Schmitter and Przeworski) of distinguishing in each camp between hard-liners and soft-liners and then analyse their interplay. While Habibie and Wiranto, for example, often leaned towards the hawks and has now been outmanoeuvred, and Adi Sasono (Muslim leader and Habibie’s Co-operatives Minister who subsidised ‘indigenous’ Muslim business to promote a ‘people’s economy’) kept his options open and tried to be more successful than Malaysia’s Anwar Ibrahim but failed miserably, the interesting doves included Bambang Yudhoyono (armed forces reformer and the new minister of Mines and Energy), Marzuki Darusman (Golkar party deputy leader, chairman of the Human Rights Commission and the new Attorney General), and at times even Akbar Tanjung

(Golkar party leader). Further, among the moderate opposition leaders, Gus Dur (until the presidential race in an alliance with Megawati) paved the way for a conservative pact through reconciliation (and may now revive his links with the nationalists), while Amien Rais was fishing for various partners until losing the elections and betting on Gus Dur to gain influence within the coming executive (but may now emerge as his contender). The students, finally, kept discussing what kind of demands could keep them together, how to face the elections, and whether to remain a ‘pure student moral force’ or call on urban poor and others to link up – until being marginalised within the adjusted institutional framework and then, from outside, ‘only’ able to prevent the total derailing of the process in general.

Capacities and contending forces

This way one may easily continue, mapping the actors and their followers, discussing their intrigues, and making the picture increasingly complicated. The established recommendation of separating the radicals, marginalising the hawks and negotiating a pact among the rest – in order to promote ‘limited but safe and steady’ democratisation – may also be considered. Of course, we know by now that this is exactly the elite-game that became dominant; and that it was won by the most skilful pact-builders Gus Dur, Amien Rais and Akbar Tanjung (while Megawati only won the elections), whereafter Wiranto lost out, Megawati’s administrators have gained some influence, and Rais has begun to contemplate an oppositional Muslim block. But where does it take us? We are confined to central-level politics and to the elite. We may analyse its ideals and its manoeuvres in much more detail; that would be the easy part. But what of the players’ room of manoeuvre? What of their capacities? International factors, then, are very important, but we will not understand much of the elections, and we do not even know much of the roots and prospects for the new

moderate pact among the establishment, if we do not look into the actors' bases beyond the political theatre of Jakarta – on the local level, both in the Jakarta area and out in the provinces. And perhaps even more important: if we are interested in the possibilities for further development of democracy beyond liberal electoralism (on the basis of people's involvement and actual capacity to make use of 'formal' democratic institutions) it is indispensable to look into the potential of alternative social and political forces.

So before we return to the very elections, the presidential race and the new 'Pact Order', we need to ask how the central level elite tried (and try) to renew its positions and win support among wider circles as well as how contending forces tried (and try) to make an impact. The so-called political opportunity structure continue to change rapidly. Suharto's attempt at a second and increasingly authoritarian Indonesian state-led development project is in shambles. The central rulers are weakened, including the armed forces. There was a power vacuum for one and a half year and the old institutions and rules of the game deteriorated. The new 'Pact Order' may now begin to change this picture, but alternative institutions are yet to be established. There are many new freedoms and opportunities, but the question is who can make use of them and how.

Little knowledge of the most important processes

The irony, however, is that we know embarrassingly little about much of this. For years attention was directed at the centre and the elite. Most of Suharto's 'New Order' was dictated in the leader's close circle with attached clients. Thereafter the bureaucracy and the 'dynamising' armed forces shared the control of the state apparatuses and its resources on each and every level, down to the very grassroots.

Politics, actually, was primarily about elite networks, with court politics on top of it all. Dissidents prevented from organising people were also elitist; relying on personalities with some integrity, many contacts, and foreign funded non-membership-based NGOs. But much of this is history now. Of course, history is important. The territorially organised army, for instance, is weakened but still there. More than thirty years of demobilisation, top-down control of almost any society-based grouping and movement, and little if any widespread knowledge among the poor masses of how democracy works will take long to make up for. And politics, to a large extent, continue to be a matter of “admission and circulation of elite networks”.¹⁰ But to extrapolate from what we know of Indonesia till the fall of Suharto is not enough.

The new primacy of local and mass politics

Rather, I would argue, there are two new major trends that call for special attention. Firstly, while the politics of elite networks may remain, the centre has lost its grip and more power (and the struggle for it) is now spreading to the provincial and local levels. This, therefore, will also be the time of local politics. Secondly, any new regime and any elite network need popular legitimacy. Hence, within the framework of more localised politics, this will also be the time of mass politics and elections.

Local politics is not only about the actors who, in the process of democratisation, dispute the mainstream definition of what constitutes the demos, the Indonesian people, and rather give priority to the fighting against Jakarta’s domination, thus suggesting various forms of disintegration – like until recently in East Timor and still in Aceh, and West Papua. Perhaps even more decisive: the growing importance of elite dominated but local and mass-related politics is a general trend. As in the

Philippines, for instance, the fall of the authoritarian regime and attempts at restoring democracy is combined with decentralisation of politics and administration, privatisation and deregulation of business – which together, I would argue, pave the way for local bosses in terms of local powerbrokers who, within a formally democratic framework, enjoy a monopolistic position over coercive and economic resources within their bailiwicks.¹¹

Bossism in the Philippines, of course, is characterised by the long history of American colonialism, partially elected government, and more private control of resources than in Indonesia. Within this framework, however, Indonesian-like primitive accumulation through political and administrative means has also been important and sometimes even decisive.¹² And vice versa, the Philippine-like liberal electoralism, decentralisation, privatisation, and deregulation are now definitely entering into the Indonesian context as well. So while most local Indonesian bosses are likely to be comparatively ‘petty’ in terms of less private wealth and more dependency on public resources, and though there may be wider space for patrons than in the Philippines – in terms of bosses with more benevolent and reciprocal relations to their subjects – there are basic similarities.

The Indonesian patrons and bosses, as well as their local associates, have links to outside superiors, and sometimes factions of the central elite – national political struggles are often localised – but also access to the voters and direct control of many resources, including within local administration and business, the territorially organised Indonesian armed forces, and among vigilantes.

This, thus, is not only likely to be an important focal point in Indonesia’s political economy, especially now that Gus Dur’s ‘Pact Order’ will enable the establishment to

adopt to revised rules of the game. In the absence of broad interest based popular organisations (like unions) and related parties (prohibited for decades), this is also how electoral campaigns may be financed and voters mobilised for a long period of time – using both private and public gold, goons, and guns – in tandem with religious and ethnic communities; the networks of which become increasingly important in times of economic crisis, disintegration of state patronage, and with as little respect for rights as for law and order. As we know from India, for instance, religion and ethnicity may not be a problem as such, until becoming vital parts of economic and political networks and contestation – like in the Moluccas, among other hard hit Indonesian areas.

This is not to deplore the breakdown of authoritarian central rule in Indonesia, but the lack of strong democratic public institutions – with a non-partisan army and police under its command to handle conflicts and prevent clashes. For instance, this has proved comparatively efficient in democratically solid Indian states with all kinds of ethnic and religious groups.¹³ In Indonesia, however, there is still little chance for previously subordinated but now more important and distressed minorities, communities, and regional and local interests, to voice their demands within the formal political system (for example through federative arrangements and local parties) and by referring to special rights and regulations.¹⁴ Hence they turn to other means of protection. Probably, therefore, conflicts between local patrons/bosses, and their collaborators (also external ones), and their thugs – who can all draw on exceedingly vulnerable sections of the population – have been behind much of the so-called religious and ethnic violence that have been reported on an almost daily basis. And this, then, is the fertile ground on which increasingly much of the national political battles between various Muslim, business, and military factions take place.

PART II:

THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES OVER TIME (c.1995 – mid-1999)

From the horizon of studies of conflicts and opposition, this is thus the complicated context within which the struggles for democracy also have to be fought out. But how shall we, within this framework, go about reading the processes and understand the problems? Since the late 1970s or so, students of both the rise of capital and neo-patrimonialism in Indonesia emphasised continuity and tended to look at studies of popular movements for political change as idealistic and a waste of time. In addition, the West was uninterested in supporting democratic forces “that couldn’t even offer a realistic alternative”. During the first part of 1998 things began to change. Some months later, as we know, legitimate government through some democratisation was put on top of the agenda. Of course, this interest is likely to diminish within business, media and diplomacy now that Gus Dur’s relatively legitimate and stable ‘Pact Order’ is installed and Wiranto is outmanoeuvred. But as already mentioned: given an analytical (and normative) interest in development of democracy, we still have to look into the potential of alternative social and political forces.

Ideally, then, we should be able to base ourselves on empirically and theoretically well grounded comparative studies of the actors’ politics of democratisation in local settings. In reality, however, much of that knowledge is lacking and time is short. Hence we should at least begin by asking the three most vital questions: What are the actors’ views of the new political situation and opportunities? What ideas and interests do they try to bring up on the political agenda, and how do they go about it?

How do they try to mobilise and organise people in support of those ideas and interests?¹⁵

Starting from this bottom line, then, we shall in this part II of the article summarise briefly the development of pro-democratic actors during the past five years or so. One phase is until the fall of Suharto; another is till the parliamentary and presidential elections and the crisis in East Timor about a year later. In the following part III of the article, then, we shift to a special analysis of those turning points. But we continue to draw on the democratic forces' bottom-up view rather than the traditional elite-game perspective.

Background

Since long, the basic problem for the democracy movement in Indonesia has been that most dissidents have been isolated from the people in general. This is because of the destruction of the broad popular movements in the mid-60s and the authoritarian rule during Suharto's 'New Order'. Till recently it was even impossible to form membership-based autonomous organisations. Aside from religious organisations, there are still very few and weak movements among people themselves to relate to. The same holds true in terms of critical ideologies and historical consciousness. Most of the dissident groups have had to work from above and out of the main urban centres where certain protection have been available from friends and temporary allies with influential positions. This way, layers of fragmented dissidents have developed over the years.

The expansion of capitalism may indirectly promote democratisation, but is a double edged sword. On the one hand, the expansion is related both to authoritarian state intervention and to a division of labour that often breaks down old class alliances and

gives rise to a multiplicity of interests and movements. On the other hand, even limited liberalisation has created some space which may allow certain people to try to partially improve their standard of living by different local efforts – not having to always grab political power first, thereafter to rely on state intervention. For many years, this local space and this need to overcome socio-economic fragmentation have spurred on Indonesian pro-democracy work from below. Despite everything, it has, thus, been possible for a lot of development oriented NGOs to relate to new social classes in society, and for a new generation of radical students to relate to peasants (hard hit by evictions) and new industrial workers. Hence the new movements were potentially significant many years before the students did away with Suharto; the movements were more than a product of the global wave of democracy and some quarrels within Jakarta's political theatre, they were and are also conditioned by the expansion of capital and the new classes thus emerging.

Moreover, there has been a tendency since the early-90s to link up alternative development and human rights work in civil society with politics. Major groupings tried their best to relate specific issues and special interests to more general perspectives. But in doing so they also tended to get stuck in either their limited kind of politicisation with some social foundation among the grassroots, or their attempts at broader perspectives without much social basis. Hence, they themselves were never able to generate a democratic opening. Instead, 'external' rallying points gave rise to a more general movement for transition from authoritarian rule. And within such a broader movement many of the outright democrats related to legally accepted populist democrats, while others held on to fragmented activism and development work, or insisted on 'consistent' top-down party building.

The development of this pattern was possible to discern between 1988 and 1996.¹⁶ And as previously indicated, this is almost exactly what happened in mid-1996 when the government ousted moderate opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri. Many genuine democrats tried to relate to the recognised political system by mobilising as many as possible behind her in face of the 1997 elections. Finally, then, the regime displayed its incapacity to reform itself by having to crack down on demonstrators and the democracy movement in general with brutal force (thus ironically generating ethnic and religious riots instead). But simultaneously the basic weakness of the movement itself became equally obvious – its fragmentation and its separation between top-down activists who tend to ‘run offside’ and grassroots activists who have not yet been able to generate interest-based mass organisations from below.

So what happened thereafter – from the crackdown in mid-1996 till about mid-1999? We shall summarise the answers to the three major questions (about the political opportunities, the politicisation of ideas and interests, and the mobilisation of people) one by one and with regard the periods before and after the fall of Suharto.¹⁷

The actors’ views of the political opportunities

What were the actors’ views of the political conditions? The ‘political opportunity structure’ consists of many factors¹⁸ but to simplify we may operationalise them along two dimensions. First, whether or not the actors believe that there is space enough for meaningful work within the established political system.¹⁹ Second, whether they believe that it is best to promote democratisation directly in civil society²⁰ under the prevailing conditions (including unequal division of power and resources) – or if they feel that one can and has to create or capture (and at best democratise) political instruments such as party and state institutions in order to then also promote

democracy by politically facilitating, for instance, civil rights and a ‘good’ civil society.²¹ Of course, actors may try several things at the same time, but here we are interested in priorities; and of course one shall in more detailed analyses also discuss where in the political system and civil society actors find that there is more or less space – but in figure 1 we arrive at four basic positions:²²

Figure 1: Actors' basic positions on where to carry out pro-democratic work.

		Space for meaningful work within the established political system?	
		No. Must work outside	Yes. Can work inside
Most meaningful to work explicitly politically or in civil society?	Priority to directly political work	I Unrecognised avant-garde policies to alter the system and thus promote democratisation	II Recognised political intervention to adjust the system and thus promote democratisation
	Priority to civil society work	III 'Empower' dissident civil society and, some add, popular movements to promote democratisation	IV Vitalise recognised parts of civil society and, some add, popular movements to promote democratisation

Under Suharto: handling limited space

Until mid-1998, the radicals were to the left in the matrix and the moderates to the right. The explicitly politicising activists aiming at the state and the political system – including those who linked up with Megawati in early-1996 and faced repression, as well as most of the students who temporarily functioned as a substitute for the lack of organised political mass movements and contributed to the fall of Suharto – were in box I.

Below in box III – and often lacking efficient co-ordination with the former – were many other radical democrats who gave priority to more indirect work in civil society, for instance by promoting human rights and alternative development.

In box II, on the contrary, were the less explicitly democratically oriented persons who tried to work through the two recognised ‘opposition’ parties at the time, as did Megawati before she was ousted, or within various state apparatuses and the pro-government Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) (though the latter was already at that time getting increasingly associated with the regime), like former NGO leader Adi Sasono.

In box IV, finally, were many semi-autonomous NGO workers but also Muslim leader Gus Dur. The latter did not link up with the government but stayed within the established widely defined political system and tried to affect it indirectly with the kind of self-restrictive actions in support of a more autonomous civil society that we know from the eighties in Eastern Europe and which inspired Gus Dur, among others.

Between Suharto and the elections: facing new opportunities

Much of this changed with the stepping aside of Suharto and the disintegration of the 'New Order' regime. It is true that the moderate opposition consistently held on to its previous line of remaining within the established system, trying to widen its framework but basically opting for reform from within – some by working inside the new government (like previously mentioned Adi Sasono), others (like Megawati, Gus Dur, and Amien Rais) by forming alliances and opting for winning elections of almost any kind. The major change here is rather that the extremely influential Muslim leader Gus Dur of the rather pragmatic and primarily rural East and Central Java based Nahdlatul Ulama movement (NU), which claim more than 30 million followers, began to supplement his previous civil society based activities (box IV) with explicitly political action, including the forming of the National Awakening Party (PKB); again just like some Eastern European dissidents with the fall of the regimes in their countries (box II).

Similarly, moreover, the initially more radical and extra-parliamentary oriented Muslim leader Amien Rais of the more modernist, widespread, and urban based Muhammadiyah movement, which claim more than 20 million followers, also gave priority to politics, including the forming of the National Mandate Party (PAN) – and adjusted to the established system. At the time, in fact, the moderate opposition as a whole even accepted, with some reservations of course, that the armed forces should retain most political and other privileges, including corporate representation in the parliament, in return for the weakening of the regime-based Golkar-party's control of the public servants and their votes.

On the other hand, till about the end of 1998, large sections of the radical democrats who stressed political change remained outside the established system, basically

arguing and demonstrating in favour of a transitional government to replace the existing regime (box I). During the massive student demonstrations in late November 1998, when the old People's Consultative Assembly, packed with Suharto loyalists, where to confirm Habibie's cabinet and policies, some students actually made it all the way to the parliament building, and they could have gone inside. But they lacked broad support – including from the moderate opposition leaders, one of whom, for instance, was not to be disturbed while taking rest. So the students went home instead, having to rethink and coming out with somewhat diverging policies to which we shall return. Thereafter some radicals held on to the old demands and the struggle on the fringes of the established system. Others seemed to adjust and to try to find the best way of relating to the then forthcoming elections. For instance, after a lot of hesitation, even the (at least in European terms) radical social democratic oriented People's Democratic Party (PRD), (which was repressed and outlawed in 1996 but then gained new strength by relating itself to the student movement and became legalised), opted for participation in the elections, despite being critical of much in the new electoral laws, despite disagreements within the party, and despite that its chairman remained in prison.

Most of the radical democrats who used to give priority to more indirect political work in civil society, through action groups and NGOs, could now also exist within the more open system (towards box IV). There were no more intelligence people pretending to fish in the canal outside the office of the Alternative Journalist Association, to take but one example. Some activists turned to the explicitly political work, including within parties. Many, however, continued their previous NGO activities which remained important as such but began to lose steam and were less influential than during the struggle against Suharto's repressive development – just

like in so many other third world countries after the fall of their dictators. Only a few activists were able to relate their associations to the radical political opposition, including the students, offering various kinds of support – from advocacy and legal aid, to food and medical assistance. In general, thus, the previous problem of linking up work in the political and civil societies persisted – a basic weakness of the democracy movement that we shall return to.

Finally, however, many pro-democratic groups and aspirations remained on the fringes of the established system. Despite of the liberalisation and the new political laws, several new parties were not allowed to run in the elections, even on the district and local levels, as they were lacking the required national presence.²³ This also made it difficult to gradually develop political constituencies from below and on the basis of shared societal ideas and interests. And as already indicated: local and regional issues, and demands for more autonomy, were swept under the carpet or subordinated to the local patrons and bosses of ‘national’ parties. So there were instead space for radical movements outside the system which give prime importance to such issues and take them to the extreme. And this, of course, was further aggravated by the lack of special rights and protection for various minorities and distressed groups, thus rather seeking protection behind vigilantes, patrons, bosses and thugs.

Similarly, many people in West Papua and Aceh did not feel that their problems and their democratic aspirations could be handled within the less authoritarian but still centralised and dominating Indonesian framework. The ‘only’ major difference in the case of East Timor was that its relative lack of valuable natural resources, its previous status as a Portuguese colony, its enlightened liberation struggle, and the unprecedented Indonesian repression generated some space within international

politics, some understanding within the Indonesian democracy movement and certain divisions within the ruling circles in Jakarta.

What ideas and interests were politicised, and how?

What kind of issues and interests, then, did the actors bring up on the political agenda, politicise, and how did they go about it? This may also be operationalised along two dimensions. First, the kind of ideas and/or interests about which people come together and which they consider in a societal perspective. Here we may distinguish between on the one hand single issues and/or specific interests, and on the other hand ideologies and/or collective interests. Second, the forms of politicisation of the ideas and interests, which may vary between 'only' putting forward demands to societal organs like state and local governments or also engage in the promotion of similar ends through, for instance, co-operatives or self-help groups. In figure 2 we thus arrive at four basic positions:

Fig. 2. Types of politicisation of ideas and interests.

		Forms of politicisation	
		Via state/local govt. only	Also via self-management
Basis of politicisation	Single issues or specific interests	A. Single pluralism ²⁴	B. Dual pluralism
	Ideology or collective interests	C. Single social	D. Dual social

Under Suharto: single issues and specific interests

Generally speaking, the years before 1998 were characterised by the lack of politicisation on the basis of collective interests, especially, of course, in terms of class. Similarly, while religious and ethic values, and general ideas about nationalism and ‘good leaders’, were important, ideologies on how societies work, should work, and could be changed were not very significant, beyond rather small groups like the PRD, (box C & D).

Rather, most pro-democratic actors focussed directly on various single issues and specific interests (box A). For instance, explicitly politicising activists aiming at the state and the political system often picked up sensitive questions such as of corruption and nepotism, the repressive role of the army, or the closing down of newspapers. Many focussed on the key role of Suharto and his family.

Likewise – but often independently – radical democrats giving priority to work in civil society (for instance within alternative development and human rights groups) addressed separate problems like environmental destruction, expropriation of land for ‘development’ purposes, harassment of women, or the imprisonment and torture of political activists. They also tried to relate to the specific interests of the various victims of repressive development – to the peasants who lost their land, to the banned journalists, to the workers losing their jobs after a strike, and so on.

While the explicitly politicising activists focused on the state and demanded radical change (box A), the more civil society oriented activists supplemented advocacy with

the promotion of various associations and self-help activities among people to somewhat strengthen their vulnerable positions (box B).

The pattern was a similar one among pro-democrats working within the established system, though they usually stressed less sensitive problems and supported less radical efforts among the victims. Interestingly, however, the moderates often focused on the specific interests of people associated with formally recognised socio-religious reform movements such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah.

Hence it is reasonable to conclude, that the absence of collective interests and ideologies as bases for how to prioritise and act on specific issues and interests contributed to the fragmentation of the democracy movement and the difficulties of co-ordinating political and civil society work. It is true that increasingly many pro-democrats engaged themselves in the directly political efforts (box A), and that civil society activities sometimes related to their actions. But the major tendency remained one of either flocking around the from time to time hottest issue and ‘most promising’ leader, or relating to communities on the basis of moral and spiritual values and ‘trustworthy’ leaders.

Between Suharto and the elections: hot issues and communalisation of interests

On surface there have been drastic changes after May 1998. It was almost surreal to watch then how till very recently forbidden issues, dangerous criticism and so-called unrealistic demands were suddenly applauded and spoken up loud and clear by yesterday ‘realists’ and shameless loyalists. (Actually, the World Bank chief were among the rather few who at least admitted that “we got it all wrong”.) The fanfares almost drowned the voices of veteran democrats and dissidents.

Similarly, ideological thinking was entering the field (movement towards box C & D). But primarily as an extension of moral and spiritual values and principles with attached communal loyalties and symbolic personalities such as Gus Dur, Megawati and Amien Rais, rarely on the basis of an understanding of how society works and may be changed. Hence there was a lack of societal perspectives through which collective interests may be identified and specific interests and single issues may be co-ordinated and prioritised.

During the period until mid-1999, it was somewhat remarkable, for instance, that in a country experiencing one of its deepest ever political, social and economic crises – and with an historical chance of finally introducing democracy – there was little if any widespread debate and mobilising on who were benefiting from the crisis, on the political economy of the IMF/World Bank recipes and their serious consequences for the majority of the population as well as Indonesia's economic and political independence, or on the need to promote popular organising on the basis of societal ideas and interests (even from an enlightened bourgeois point of view). Not to talk of the almost absurd lack of a widespread and reasonably consistent democracy movement for more than getting rid of Suharto and his cronies and generals and staging some kind of elections so that some others may also be able to share the spoils. Most of the political parties did not even seem to bother much about constitutional changes and what kind of new political laws were institutionalised during early-1999 – as long as they would have a reasonable chance of making it in elite negotiations and elections. And in the few discussions on preconditions for introducing, institutionalising and further developing democracy, one is overwhelmed by references to the importance of the middle classes, the compromising incumbents and the fostering of civil society but, for instance, hardly ever comes across a note on

the historically so vital (especially in Europe) and scientifically accepted basic importance of popular political- and union organising.²⁵

Rather, and despite everything, the general trend was instead the continuation and even intensification of the politicisation of single issues and specific interests (especially box A). The students and their supporters among primarily human rights groups were in the forefront of bringing up a series of uncomfortable questions. The first was about *KKN* (graft, corruption and nepotism) and focussed on the need to put Suharto and his henchmen on trial, and to hold them politically, economically and morally responsible. The second focus was on the role of the armed forces and the importance of putting an end to the military's *dwi-fungsi* (dual function), its right to political and economic (in addition to military) power, and to hold it accountable for the assaults, torture and murders committed by its members and associated thugs (among whose victims students also figured). The third – but less specified – was about the need for genuine elections and the democratisation of a great many state institutions. And all this, many claimed, called for a clean and more widely accepted transitional government.

Before we turn later on to the exciting problems of implementing all this, however, we must pay additional attention to what was not politicised. It is quite clear, of course, that the issues of *KKN* and Suharto, and the dual function of the army, covered most of what the 'New Order' was all about, and involved most of its loyalists. Yet, this was far from a campaign – such as that of the dissidents' and the West's in the former Soviet Union or Eastern Germany – that related to the ideological fundamentals, the class bases and the international underpinnings of the 'New Order'. These were issues, rather, that focussed on some of the basic

shortcomings of the 'New Order', especially from a middle class point of view, not on its roots and dynamics.

Actually, among the negative effects of the 'New Order' that especially the students stressed, one rarely finds those which might have been of more immediate interest for ordinary people, whose first concern was probably whether they would be able to make use of new democratic institutions so that a 'formally' more democratic order will also lead to more jobs and food. Not even those questions on which the students were most knowledgeable and which others found difficult to master, complicated things such as election laws and their implementation, especially on the local level, made it on to the agenda. These were not suitable for the parliament of the street. And one result of this, of course, was that the students were not only a bit isolated from ordinary people but also from the actual negotiations and decisions which then anyway would be handled by the elite and its allies.

It is true that ideologically based groups like the PRD could offer some contacts and (at times overly theoretical) perspectives. And it is true that sections within Megawati's PDI-P, Amien Rais' PAN, as well as the student movement associated with NU, could offer some bridges. But PRD was and is still weak and one may be rather sceptical of the actual importance of the more 'issue oriented' people within PDI or PAN or NU on the local level, among the grassroots, where communal loyalties, populism and clientelism seemed to dominate. So probably it is equally important to point to the potential that was illustrated by the urban poor (NGO) coalition in Jakarta when disclosing, in face of the elections, grave political manipulation and corruption associated with the for ordinary people very important

state-operated but internationally financed social security net, and simultaneously organising alternative distributive networks among poor people themselves (box B).

So where and how were all concrete grievances and various interests among ordinary people brought up? To where did people turn when there were no genuine interest based mass movements like unions or farmers' organisations and when the state was crumbling and lacking resources? The best answer is probably that they turned to families, relatives, patrons and networks. And here, of course, were also the local patrons, bosses and socio-religious organisations and NGOs – with some outside contacts and support. So not only was this the main hunting field for politicians (something which we shall return to) but also an increasingly divisive and explosive framework (with all kinds of material and spiritual claims involved) for politicisation of already rather fragmented issues and interests.

How did the actors mobilise and organise people?

Given the spheres in which actors have found that there is most space for their work, and the actors' politicisation of ideas and interests, how did they, then, also try to politicise people by including them into politics through mobilisation and organisation? This final dimension may be operationalised in three steps.

First (in general accordance with Nicos Mouzelis)²⁶ by distinguishing historically between the integration of people into politics on the basis of relatively autonomous broad popular movements generated by comprehensive economic development (like in many parts of Western Europe), and the elitist incorporation of people with less solid organisations of their own into comparatively advanced polities in economically late-developing societies (like in the Balkans and many Third World countries).

Second (following Mouzelis again) by separating between two ways of incorporating people: clientelism and populism. Clientelism, primarily, is associated with what we have called patrons or bosses on different levels with their own capacity to deliver some protection in return for services and votes.²⁷ In many cases, I would add, clientelism is also ‘modernised’ in the form of state-corporatism. Populism, on the other hand, generally goes with charismatic leaders who are able to express popular feelings and ideas, but not necessarily interests, and whose positions are essential to the stability of adjoining leaders and their ability to patronise followers. In addition to this, I would argue, political leaders aiming at integrating people into politics have often tried short cuts by adding elements of clientelism and populism – thus usually ending up with strong elements of incorporation – which we may label alternative patronage.

Third by distinguishing (in general accordance with Sidney Tarrow)²⁸ between two basic methods of rather trying to integrate people into politics: one emphasising autonomous collective action and another focusing upon the internalisation of actions and movements in organisation with some leadership. The key-factor is the ‘mobilisation structure’ that helps movements to co-ordinate and persist over time by linking the ‘centre’ (in terms of formally organised leadership identifying aims and means) and the ‘periphery’ (in terms of the actual collective action in the field). Historically (according to Tarrow) there are two solutions: to either trust people’s natural and spontaneous willingness and ability to resist repression and exploitation through linked networks and federations of autonomous associations (in reality, however, through instigating organic leaders as spearheads), or to stress the need for political ideology, organisation and intervention through integrated structures of parties, unions and self-help organisations (which in reality may hamper dynamic

collective action). In the West those have often been rooted in anarchist and democratic socialist thinking, respectively.²⁹ To avoid biased connotations, I shall instead talk of networks and organised integration.³⁰

Hence we arrive, in figure 3, at five different ways of including people into politics from the mid-1990's till mid-1999 – which may be combined (to begin with) with the previously discussed positions on where to carry out pro-democratic work.

Figure 3: Basic strategic concepts among pro-democratising movements from c.1995 – mid-1999 on where to carry out pro-democratic work and ways of including people into politics.

	----- Incorporation -----			---- Integration ----	
	I Populism	II Clientelism (state-corporatism)	III Alternative patronage	IV Networks	V Organised integration
	<i>In/out of system</i>	<i>In/out of system</i>	<i>In/out of system</i>	<i>In/out of system</i>	<i>In/out of system</i>
Priority to directly political work	1. E.g. Megawati and then partly also Gus Dur	2. E.g. Sasono within ICMI (and increasingly also Megawati and Gus Dur)	3. Leading radical patrons in e.g. party and NGO-alliance	4. Networking avant-garde catalysts	5. General organisers
Priority to civil society work	6. Partly e.g. Gus Dur (primarily before May 1998)	7. E.g. NGOs related to Sasono plus Gus Dur/NU boarding-schools	8. Local radical patrons in e.g. a party or NGO	9. 'Independent' NGOs with grassroots activities	10. Movement organisers-cum-co-ordinators

Under Suharto: divisive logics

Around 1996 the populism that was so important during the Sukarno period returned to the explicitly political level with his daughter Megawati (box 1) and to civil society with Gus Dur, (box 6 and 7). Meanwhile insiders like Adi Sasono, who had just left developmental NGO activism and business management, tried to turn pro-government ICMI into a forum for the modernisation of clientelism into Malaysian-like state-corporatism (box 2) and wanted to use politics in order to promote Muslim developmental NGO work (box 7).

The most consistent and outspoken democrats, however, were among the myriad of groupings at the other end of the figure. Ever since the liberation struggle, much of the activism in Indonesia, especially among students and then also in several NGOs, has been and still is based on radical, courageous, often personalised, and sometimes moral leadership that is supposed to ignite people's spontaneous ability to resist. In the late-eighties, a new generation of activists began staging daring demonstrations, trying to give voice to subordinated people. 'Action maniacs' constantly hunted for new issues attracting media but did demonstrate that there was more space for radical action than most 'established' dissidents thought (box 4).

In the same basic category were also most grassroots groups and supportive NGOs trying to 'empower' civil society, harnessing people's own protests but staying out of explicit politics and leaving it to 'people themselves' to organise (box 9).

Among the organised integration category, on the other hand, we found general organisers (box 5) who agreed on the need to change state and government but drew

instead on two other different political traditions. Firstly, the middle-class intellectuals who tried to build 'modern' parties but ended up in the fifties and sixties with elitist formations like that of the socialists, or elite-based parties based on conventional loyalties, like those of the Muslims and populist nationalists. Secondly, the reformist communists who also made use of some conventional loyalties but still managed to build in the fifties and sixties a comparatively 'modern' party with some 20 million people in attached popular organisations.

What remained in the mid-1990's were basically leaders from the elitist tradition who first supported Suharto but then turned critics and were deprived of their organisational bases. Their main remaining asset was some integrity and legitimacy in the eyes of many people, and among Western governments and agencies. In face of the current crisis and the possible return of mass-politics, there were attempts to draw again (as during the fifties and sixties) on conventional loyalties among Muslims and populist nationalists.

The reformist communists, on the other hand, were (and are) no more - but instead a new generation of mostly young former 'action maniacs' who since 1994 bet on ideology and organisation to build a new socialist party by mobilising from above workers, urban poor, displaced peasants and frustrated students. Here are, thus, the roots of the PRD that was made a scapegoat after the riots in Jakarta in mid-1996, and then faced repression.

Finally in the organised integration category we should also mention the rather few leaders who tried to work less on an explicitly political level and rather bring civil society initiatives together, though with an organised mobilisation framework (box 10). For instance there were such attempts among some grassroots based labour

groups, with the assistance of devoted NGO activists. And at least in principle, the independent electoral watchdog KIPP could have developed into a non-partisan *democratic* watch movement linking up civil society grassroots initiatives and top-down political activists, but primarily remained with the latter.

None of those major actors trying to integrate people into politics, however, were markedly successful. Hence, in most cases their democratising potential did not vary *directly* with their strategic positions. The important common denominator was instead their pattern of politicisation of ideas and interests. There was a basic orientation towards single issues and specific interests (box A&B), especially among the comparatively firmly based grassroots workers (box 9) and the many rather free floating avant-garde catalysts (box 4). Moreover, when (as since about 1994) almost all the actors made efforts anyway to address general problems of democratisation they did so, firstly, within the framework of ‘their’ old strategic positions and, secondly, by relating ‘their’ issues or ‘their’ interests to general problems and lose ideologies which quite often had more to do with values and leader’s perspectives than a general perspective on how societies work and may be changed. The end result was both conflicts between various factions and a tendency to unintentionally cause trouble for each other. At the time I labelled this divisive politicisation.

The outcome in 1996, as we know, was that the activists who sensed a political opening and shortcut in the conflict over Megawati (when the regime did not accept her as elected leader of the PDI) bet on alternative patronage and ran offside (box 3), while the long term potential of the civil society grassroots work was left behind. To the divisive politicisation of ideas and interests we must thus add the divisive logic of politicisation of people as well (mobilisation). The only optimistic prospect, then, was

that the strategic perspective of the still weak and untested movement organisers-cum-co-ordinators (box 10) – who tried to bring initiatives at the civil society grassroots level together but within a organised integration framework - would gain strength and prove more fruitful. But they were overtaken by the divisive tendencies in the democracy movement as a whole. For instance, the just mentioned attempts at co-ordinating labour organising at the grassroots level were not seen as an important basis for the simultaneous attempts at building an electoral-cum-democracy watch movement. Even labour activists saw those as separate projects.

Meanwhile the strategy among outright pro-democrats to bet on alternative patronage continued (box 3 and 8). To begin with, however, the hanging on to Megawati was replaced, during the build up to the 1997 fake elections, by not too successful attempts to also rally behind sections of the other officially accepted party, the Muslim so-called United Development Party, PPP. (Gus Dur opposed this. The link with PPP could have weakened him. He had to consider both competition from other Muslim leaders, inside as well as outside NU, and the fact that NU-members, then without a political organisation of their own, voted different parties, including Golkar. This, thus, caused him to link up instead with Suharto's daughter Tutut.)

Then, as the economic crisis deepened in late-1997 and early-1998, this was followed by efforts by some intellectuals to portray former minister and technocrat Emil Salim as an alternative. In the final days of Suharto, the young Golkar related Sultan of Yogyakarta also abandoned the sinking ship and came out much like an alternative patron during a massive rally in Yogya. Finally, of course, there were also continuous attempts by Muslim intellectuals, students and their activist friends to not just take

shelter behind but also introduce a more radical and democratic agenda within the broad framework of NU as well as liberal sections of Amien Rais' Muhammadiyah.

Between Suharto and the elections: (1) schismatical but 'efficient' incorporation

What were the major new developments from the fall of Suharto till the elections?

We shall address this in two sections, this one on incorporation, the following on efforts at integration. In the first case, populism, of course, increased. But perhaps more importantly: clientelism was getting even more decisive, both on the explicitly political level and in civil society. For instance, as already noted, Gus Dur and NU formed a major new party, PKB, and several minor parties were also drawing on the NU community (box 2). Moreover, while previously having recommended Megawati for president, Gus Dur after some time seemed to be a serious candidate himself.

Further, Amien Rais formally left his position as chairman of Muhammadiyah to lead the new PAN party. PAN was the only project among intellectuals to introduce a new democratic agenda within the old socio-religious organisations that took off. This was not just to invest in Amien Rais as an alternative leader-cum-patron, but also a conscious effort among pro-democrats to use his interest in a broader basis beyond Muhammadiyah and to help him build up PAN as a modern issue-based and liberal-oriented party in order to then make Rais dependent on such policies, and such a machinery. Questions on the extent to which this was successful are thus more fruitful than the one in vogue on whether Rais himself was and is serious or not about his new secular, liberal and non-racist image.

The general tendency, however, was to move up on the explicitly political level and to include people into politics by drawing on religious (and to some extent ethnic)

communities and their local leaders and associates – in exchange for ability to gain future political positions and benefits (box 1 and 2 plus partly 6 and 7).

This is equally true, of course, of ICMI and Adi Sasono. In fact Adi Sasono was probably even more consistent in his approach, banking as previously on the possibilities of using powers and resources within government and administration to support NGO-like work in civil society (box 2 and 7). Now this was done as part of the efforts during the crisis to build a ‘people’s economy’ within the ‘informal sector’ and through support for, for instance, co-operatives and various social-safety networks.

So while the democracy movement was unable to link work on the explicitly political level with that in civil society, this was now done quite ‘efficiently’ by way of clientelism and on the basis of on the one hand religious (plus to some extent ethnic) communities and on the other political clout (box 1 and 2 plus 6 and 7 as well as box A and B, with connections to religious ideologies in C and D). But the result, of course, was even more divisiveness, dangerous conflicts between various communities, patrons, bosses, thugs and followers – and an even weaker democracy movement.

In addition to this were the persistent efforts by pro-democrats to promote a united front between Megawati, Gus Dur, Amien Rais and the Sultan of Yogyakarta by way of not just establishing links but also, by building a broad and radical movement behind them; just as the students in 1945 prevailed upon nationalist leaders like Sukarno to proclaim the country’s independence, and to refuse any compromise with the colonial overlords. But this time, in November 1998, as we know, their overtures were rebuffed.

Between Suharto and the elections: (2) divisive and unconnected integration

(a) The students

This brings us to the actors in favour of integration and, to begin with, to the radical students who were so important in doing away with the Suharto regime; (we will address the other outright democrats in the following sub-section). During the first months of 1998 students' protests gained momentum all over the country. This was not just a continuation of the Indonesian history of intellectuals and students who from time to time come out as a 'moral force' against abusive rulers and ignite people's anger. The new student movements were also, basically, continuing along the same track as our previously discussed networking avant-garde catalysts who began to focus in the late-eighties on a series of 'hot' issues and staging daring demonstrations (box 4 plus A). A major difference, of course, was that there were no longer a few hundreds of 'action maniacs only, but hundreds of thousands and sometimes links with NGO activists (box 9 and B). Yet the students were in many ways up against similar problems as yesterday's avant-garde catalysts.

Putting the point simply they were by late-1998 and early-1999 confronted with three great obstacles, and they were only able to surmount the first of them. The first challenge was presented by a campaign that portrayed them as immature muddleheads who mainly caused traffic problems with all their demonstrations, and who wanted to bring down the old order but had no program for what to put in its place. There was, to be sure, something to this. In Jakarta, at the time, I was often reminded of the student movement of 30 years ago in Europe. The latter too was not just pronouncedly political; it was cultural and anti-authoritarian as well. Yet that was nothing to despise; indeed, it was probably that which had the greatest significance over the long

run. In addition, there was among the new Indonesian students a still greater and more hopeful and dynamic power which issued from the fact that they were not just breaking with authoritarian structures: they were also rediscovering history (which was forbidden) and opening up their society (which was closed). The students were the weeds that broke suddenly through the asphalt and burst into full bloom: beautiful but disordered. And most of them neither were more are, most assuredly, naive or muddleheaded. Great numbers of them did and do read, discuss, analyse, and come to democratic decisions. Never, I dare say, have I encountered students with such questioning minds and such a thirst for knowledge as those who, in December 1998, took me off in an old borrowed taxi to meet with a larger group of young leaders from various campuses, and who then insisted on a six-hour marathon lecture on the political situation and the historical background. The hour grew late, yet it seemed to me that the gathering burned like a beacon in the Jakarta night. In the long run, the students had and have history on their side.

When the dawn broke, however, it was still over the Jakarta at the time, and that made things harder. The second problem faced by the students was the fact that as good as all established forces tried to tame and use them. For one thing, Habibie, Wiranto and their cohorts in the regime were doing their best to keep control and to acquire new legitimacy by directing the reform process from above, and by marginalising radicals like the students. In addition leaders like Gus Dur, Megawati, and Amien Rais were taking advantage of the fact that the students were putting pressure on the regime. This enabled those leaders to compromise with the weakened establishment, and to carry out cautious changes at a tranquil pace. The moderates were also trying to tame the students, so as to be able to contest the upcoming elections with a minimum of disturbance.

The students were at loss as to how to deal with this. In November 1998 (in relation to the extra-ordinary People's Consultative Assembly) they failed in enforcing the moderate leaders to unite and to go ahead on the basis of a radical mass movement. So then the students were faced with a third problem: that of formulating a political program of their own, and building an independent political base. This was the hardest challenge of all. The students functioned as a substitute for the lack of broad organisations among the middle and lower classes. They had no politics of their own, however, for linking their demonstrations both with the concerns of ordinary people and with the established political institutions, where negotiations were conducted and decisions made (difficulties of linking box 4 and 9 plus relating to box C and D).

Changing this was difficult, for the weakness of the students was also their strength. Their strength lay in independence, integrity, and a lack of self-interest at a time when most everything was (and is) dominated by new and old patrons and bosses within politics, the economy, and the armed forces. Largely gone now was the approach of the earlier students, which was to ally themselves with critics in the military, the political system, and the intellectual upper crust (box 4 and partly 5 only). Even the pro-democratic elite of yesterday complained at the time that the students did not always listen to them and did not follow their advice. Yet if this was a strength it was also a weakness, for what would serve as the base for the students' demands? What were the social moorings for their politics, their basis of politicisation (box C and D)? In order to protect their independence, as well as to avoid provocateurs and undisciplined masses of people, they even hesitated to allow 'ordinary people' to take part in the demonstrations and to demand their rights and defend their interests.

In the same way, it was both a strength and a weakness that the students were lacking a cohesive organisation with a distinct and encompassing leadership structure. It was (and is) networks that ruled the roost here (box 4 and 9). This means there was no top figure to seize or co-opt. It also means it was possible to adjust to local conditions and to make use of the new vitality. At the same time, however, this loose organisational pattern made it hard for the students to reach out beyond their own group, to mobilise people on a broad basis, or to reach common decisions over long-term questions. The students were only able to unite behind resounding demands which were simple enough to be proclaimed on the streets and in the squares.

Worst of all, the students did not know to relate to the coming elections. If we form a party, they said, we will be divided, and our independence and moral force will be lost. And if we concentrate our resources on political education and electoral watch, many added, we will risk legitimising not just a few good new forces, but also all those old villains who will assuredly be elected too. So even if the students had nothing against elections, their efforts were likely to prove irrelevant when election fever would spread, and people realise that "villains or not – the only ones we have to vote for are the politicians of today and their parties."

So while the regime succeeded in keeping control over the reform process, and the moderate politicians placed their bets on a compromise with the establishment, the students were thrown upon their own resources. And these resources were, to be sure, substantial and promising in many ways. But the students' strength was also their weakness, as seen in the lack of a connection between the concerns of ordinary people, the actions of the students, and the established political institutions. Hence, the admonitory conclusion in early-1999 was that if the student movement did not

succeed in creating such a connection – for instance in the form of a second liberation movement rooted in the interests of ordinary people, and devoted to the achievement of successive and deepened democratisation both before and after the elections (at least linking box 4 and 9, and coming closer to 5 and 10, plus turning to box C and D) – it would most likely end up as a collection of fragmented pressure groups. While elected patrons and bosses attended to the making of policy and the exercise of power. This, of course, would be much better than yesterday's authoritarian exploitation and the post-Suharto unrest on the verge of breakdown, but it would hardly be the best breeding ground for stable and deepened democracy.

(b) Other outright democrats

What, then, of the independent NGOs with grassroots activities who focused on civil society (box 9)? As previously pointed out, while some activists took up explicitly political work, many continued with their previous activities which, of course, were as important as ever, for instance with regard to human rights, or the plight of tribes and minorities, or environmental destruction, or the promotion of autonomous co-operatives among weak sections of the population. But this was the time when all actors had started to say nice things about democracy and human rights, and this was the start of mass politics. The voices of the dissidents were easily getting drowned. And they were still not very good at either mobilising people or at co-ordinating their activities with the outright political activists (box 4 and partly 5). So my conclusion at the time was that on their own, (and much like the students) they were likely to come out as rather fragmented pressure-cum lobbying groups that also tried to service some more or less popular alternative-development initiatives.

Could the actors within the organised integration category make a difference (box 10)? They were also up against severe difficulties. On the one hand, many of the middle-class oriented general organisers (box 5), who were deprived of their organisational basis during the 'New Order' now tried to rebuild it – like Bintang Pamungkas with his PUDI (United Indonesian Democratic Party) and Muchtar Pakpahan with his National Labour Party on the basis of his trade union. But there was a shortage of time and an almost total lack of popular organisations to draw on. So some leaders said they rather preferred to work in action groups, or media, or NGOs, or as (at times) influential experts (box 9). And others simply gave up their ambition to integrate rather than incorporate people into politics and went for alternative patronage or even populism or clientelism instead (box 3, 1 and 2).

Interestingly, finally, the PRD (box 5) tried another way of relaunching itself after years of repression and to catch up with the need to go for mass politics. Rather than immediately attempting at building mass based interest organisations (for instance among workers and peasants), the PRD gave priority to students and tried to link them and their issues to wider sections of the population (primarily linking box 5 and 4 plus partly 9 and 10). Moreover, the PRD activists finally decided not to ignore the elections but to rather try to relate to them by not just participating but also stressing many other problems of democratisation. Hence, I concluded at the time, one should not ignore PRD's long-term possibilities of advancing – despite conflicts within the party, some voluntarism, and overly theoretical tendencies – given its perspective, its principled and young but already rather experienced and mature activists, some famous new members like celebrated author and former communist sympathiser Pramoedya Ananta Toer, the wider space for work, and especially the widespread discontent among large sections of the population on the grassroots level. Of course,

much of people's anger was still channelled through communal groups, local patrons and bosses and their thugs. And most previous communist followers were still vulnerable enough to abandon their various least worst patrons. But the local unrest frequently reported upon was not just outright clashes between religious communities or rival gangs but also, for instance, of peasants taking back lost land, workers turning against managers, and local people turning against repressive and corrupt police and local government officers.³¹ So even though outright political organisations like the PRD were yet far too weak to make a difference here, more civil society oriented movement organising (box 10) at the local level might also have come forward. And this, of course, would have been precisely that absolutely vital link between organised political and civil society work that could have been stimulated by a broad democratic and not just electoral watch movement, but that did not come about.

PART III

THE ELECTIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

The following parliamentary elections of June 1999, the crisis in East Timor, the appointment of Gus Dur as new president (with Megawati as vice), the rise of his 'Pact Order' and its conflicts are turning points which call for special analyses. In many ways those events were dominated by the top level actors. But let us continue here to set aside the elite game as such and read instead the election and its aftermath from below, from the point of view of the just outlined dynamics of the democratic forces.

The birth of the world's third largest democracy

The June 1999 elections were boring, for parachuted journalists. Too little violence and cheating to report, and too little knowledge to explain why. Comparatively democratic rules of the game, and the inclusion of most parties involved, forced much of the elite to temporarily compete by mobilising votes rather than manipulating in closed circles and provoking religious and ethnic groups only. That was a victory of sorts. And much of the frequently reported delay in the counting was less because of successful cheating than time-consuming checks and balances to counter them, plus frustration, of course, among elite politicians who had lost their real or imagined old constituencies but remained within the new Election Commission. Except in East Timor, Aceh, West Papua and a few other places, some 100 million people finally felt that their vote did matter and patiently waited for the results. In a way we witnessed the birth of the second rather than the third largest democracy in the world, as so many Americans don't even bother to cast their vote.

But while the very elections were rather free and fair, the context was not so just and the substance was shallow. There was a lack of reasonably equal opportunities to make use of the political liberties and many fundamental problems continued to be swept under the carpet. This will hit back, and this is, therefore, what we should focus on, if we are interested in the prospects for stability and substantial democratisation.

First, the unjust electoral system. One single result was not delayed: that the armed forces would receive 7.6% of the seats in the parliament (or four more seats than *reformasi* leader Amin Rais' party got in the open elections). Further, 34% of the delegates who then elected the new president in October were not elected but appointed by the military and political elite in closed, smoky metropolitan and provincial rooms. Also beforehand, ex-communist as well as local parties were

prohibited, and remarkably many seats were allotted to provinces where Habibie's Golkar-party machinery remained intact.

Second, the unjust preconditions. While Golkar made good use of the state apparatuses and control of foreign funded credits for co-operatives and social safety net programs, especially on the outer islands, self-asserted Western democrats gave priority to stable government through instant elections of 'legitimate' rulers rather than democracy in terms of people's rule and stability through acceptable chances for everyone to influence politics and keep track of elected politicians. Foreign support for democratisation was limited to electoral arrangements, technical information, and some promotion of civic virtues through NGOs, while critical voters education about the actual political forces involved was scarce and promotion of democratic organisations among labourers, farmers, civil servants and employees was almost absent – not to talk of potentially important parties on the basis of ideas about how societies work and may be changed. Such priorities may be in line with a shallow version of democracy where parties are just machines for the election of elite politicians and people can only make some difference through a myriad of single issue and special interest groups. But it is a bit away from a more informed understanding of the dynamics involved and definitely, for instance, from European, Indian or South African experiences where broad popular organisations and parties were essential for the birth and growth of democracy.

Predictably, on the one hand, the Indonesian outcome was, thus, top-down mobilisation of votes on the basis of populism and clientelism through the established political machines of Golkar (22,4% of the votes and 120 seats), PDI-P, Democratic Party of Struggle (33,7%;153 seats), PPP, the Muslim Democratic Development Party

(10,7%; 58 seats) and the established socio-religious organisations of NU with its major party PKB, National Awakening Party (12,6%; 51 seats), plus Muhammadiyah in support of ‘modernist-Muslim’ candidates. On the other hand, the exciting attempt to form a new liberal middle class party PAN, National Mandate Party – with secular centre-left politics, Muslim values and *reformasi*-leader Amien Rais as a locomotive – proved much more difficult (7,1%; 34 seats). Aside from the armed forces 38 seats, the remaining 46 seats (13,5% of the votes) were shared by minor parties, the primarily Muslim-based. The students, moreover – who forced the elite to do away with Suharto, who were in the forefront of the reformation process, and who put pressure on the traditional politicians – lost momentum and were marginalised. And since way back genuine development, human rights and democracy activists now often said, that their attempts to help people themselves to organise were distorted by the neo-traditional political competition.

Third, then, the shallowness of the elections. This is not to agree with the many observers who talked of excited masses in support of a weak woman and a blind man without real programs. The largest and second largest democracies in the world, India and the USA, have elected and survived equally qualified leaders. And even aside from PAN’s educated middle-class program, certain issues did play an important role in terms of people’s expectations and trust in Megawati of PDI-P and Gus Dur of PKB as symbols of dignified resistance against Suharto and peaceful improvement without religious and ethnic conflicts, along old ideals from the struggle for independence. No, the major problem is rather that it will be very difficult for the essentially traditional and conservative politicians now elected to live up to the expectations of ordinary people, especially of the broad and essentially unorganised social movement around PDI-P and Megawati.

There might, thus, be a rather long honeymoon for the new leaders, especially if the economy picks up a bit and the military are kept at bay. But the fact is that voters in the new instant democracy have been mobilised through old perspectives, loyalties and machines which do not correspond with and may not be able to cope with the new major conflicts and ideas in society. Let me point to four tendencies related to, first, the economic and social problems, second, East Timor and the centrifugal tendencies, third, the role of the new middle classes, and fourth, the established parties and the future of the anti-monopolistic struggle – and to analyse them one by one in the following sections – before concluding by discussing Gus Dur’s ‘Pact Order’ and the political violence, the neglected democratic preconditions, and (thus) the democratic vacuum.

The major hidden crisis

The major issue for most Indonesians was a non-issue – how they should be able to cope with the most severe economic crisis since the birth of the nation. Corruption, of course, was on top of the agenda. And nobody denies the importance of fighting it and of totally reforming the relevant legal and economic institutions. But what are the interests involved? What are the social and political forces that can enforce efficient checks and balances? Some honest top-level politicians are not enough. Even the IMF’s fundamental structural adjustment program was kept outside the election campaign, and even the Asian Wall Street Journal (21/6/99) questioned the fact that the Indonesian people was not allowed to take an independent stand on such a vital issue in its democratic elections. But the depoliticisation of the crisis was a good illustration of the structural character of Indonesia’s dependence on international business and finance as well as the ‘international community’. It testified to the

weakness of Indonesia's trade unions and other popular organisations. And it was a good indication of the consensus between Washington and the Indonesian elite, or at least of the submission of the latter to the former.

With Gus Dur's 'Pact Order' there might now be somewhat more emphasis on small-scale industry and agricultural development. But generally speaking, Gus Dur is betting on as good as possible relations with international business and finance and on living up to the expectations of the IMF. The major current problem is the struggles with the political, economic, and military elite on what companies and banks should be looted or saved and/or sold out – and who shall win and who shall lose in the process. And equally generally speaking, the new instant democracy can not offer a legitimate institutional framework for the handling of people's socio-economic hardship and protests. The ministry for social affairs has been closed down, with the argument that civil society should take care of people's problems. And the new minister of 'manpower' is even an old Golkar-man. Meanwhile genuine labour activists find established politics irrelevant, "as it does not matter much in workers' daily lives". And employers make up for the loss of outright military intervention in labour disputes by drawing on their market bargaining power in times of crisis, establishing fake 'unions' and setting up their own security forces with police and military personnel as part-time 'consultants'.

The regional grievances and the crisis in East Timor

In addition to the economic crisis, the second major problem – the regional grievances and the struggle in East Timor – was also removed from the mainstream political agenda. As previously mentioned, local parties were not even allowed in the local elections, and the new laws on decentralisation remained as abstract as the

military repression remained concrete. While this was in order to ‘preserve national unity’, the real problems of domestic colonialism and the occupation of East Timor persisted and soon popped up outside the new democratic framework, where they immediately proved even more difficult to solve. The killings and protests in Aceh continued as did the struggles between migrants and ‘sons of the soil’ (of various beliefs and ethnic origins) in Kalimantan or Maluku. There were even new economic conflicts between migrant groups in free-zone Batam next to Singapore.

But East Timor was special, and worst. Its status as a Catholic former Portuguese colony without rich natural resources was unique in the archipelago, and so was the engagement of the ‘international community’. At least by June 1999 (in a lengthy talk with Xanana Gusmão) it seemed to me that the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT) might prove right in “trusting its (the international community’s) alternative institutions and give priority to reconciliation”. But it did not turn out that well.

Yet it is important not to forget that everybody, including the CNRT, agreed to brave the risks and seize the unique opportunity that arose when then president Habibie in January 1999 sought to trade East Timor for international support but insisted in full Indonesian responsibility for the security arrangements.

Actually, the unfolding of the violence in East Timor was more a repercussion of the domestic crisis in Indonesia, which in many ways went from bad to worse following the elections in June. It was primarily the kind of elections that West then supported which helped creating precisely that political vacuum and space for the military that paved the way for the human catastrophe in East Timor and the renewed attacks on democracy in Indonesia. For as previously noted, basic problems – such as protests in

the provinces – could still not find an outlet in the open political system. So such problems were consigned, rather, to the military and to the parliament of the street. And while the democracy movement was marginalised in the process of liberal electoralism, the military and the old corporative organisations were granted continued political representation. So the elected politicians were made dependent on the non-elected 34% of the delegates who were to select a new president.

With regard to East Timor, the logics of the military and its civilian associates (including internationally well respected figures such as then foreign minister Ali Alatas) were to first create semi-civilian counterparts to the CNRT in negotiations; then to further develop and empower militias to promote the pro-autonomy side in the referendum by creating fear among the immigrants for what would happen if East Timor became independent, and fear among the East-Timorese for terror in the future in case they didn't accept Indonesian dominance; and finally to display for protesting people in other Indonesian provinces what kind of problems and horror they would have to face in case they went ahead.

In case of losing the referendum, the additional aspect of the logics was to create a mini-civil war in order to, firstly, further eliminate, if possible, the Falantil (the armed liberation movement), and, secondly, not lose face but be able to say "we invaded East Timor in 1975 to save the country from a civil war and when we leave there will again be a civil war".

Meanwhile, the CNRT impressively kept its promise to keep a low profile and not allowing itself to be provoked by consistently stressing reconciliation, but had difficulties in simultaneously shaping a back up in case things would go wrong.

At the same time, the UN proceeded with the referendum on August 30, though also, to my knowledge, without any serious back up. And as far as I understand, both those parties felt that they would have given in to the militias' intimidation and given up the unique opportunity if they had not gone ahead with the referendum, despite the risks. So, while people bravely resisted intimidation and terror, and the armed forces respected the very electoral operation (just like during the Indonesian elections), the militias began to follow their own logic. And even after having arranged the proof of its point (that some kind of civil war would follow if East Timor would go for independence), the central armed forces command was incapable of finally also displaying its strength by 'handling' (suppressing) it all, which used to be the 'normal' pattern. Apparently a monster had been created that now ran wild.

In this situation it was difficult for the CNRT to do more than refrain from being provoked and thus eliminated, which must have been difficult enough. In this situation, moreover, the UN was also rather helpless. Of course, immediate UN strengthening of its local representatives in order to maintain its presence would have been in full accordance with the May agreement (Article 7) – and disgracefully enough, that was not done. But when most people also wished that the UN should have done much more, it is important to remember that it simply was not realistic.

So let us discuss instead the increasingly popular 'truth of the day' within the Western 'international community': that the UN ought to have been able without hindrance to sanction armed intervention when hell broke loose, but that especially China and several other developing countries were opposed.

That indeed can be said. But it was the US which approved Indonesia's occupation of East Timor in 1975, it was Australia which recognised its annexation, it was both

which sponsored Jakarta's special military forces, it was also Sweden and Norway (among others) which gave top priority to business dealings with Suharto's Indonesia, and it was the entire West which adopted the particularly rigid Asian version principle of non-intervention in the area even in the face of genocide (by backing the Khmer Rouge regime).

East Timor certainly shows that international emergency assistance must be a matter of course when people are being terrorised and murdered as surely as when they are starving and dying. Yet the basic question is, will an intervention strengthen the forces of democracy which must be capable of assuming the leadership? Presuming, that is, that we do not propose making most countries in the world into Western protectorates with UN soldiers in every bush.

I myself persist in the view than an armed intervention without Jakarta's consent would have made it possible for the Indonesian military and militias to ideologically transform their terror and murder into a war of 'Indonesian national self-defence', eliminate the independence movement, and reintroduce autocratic rule in Indonesia itself. Not even the brave students would have been able, in such a scenario, to stand their way.

Luckily, however, the West was not able to start a war, and the International Monetary Fund itself wanted to put the squeeze on Jakarta (for the Baligate bank scandal). So the Indonesian democrats were able to stand up to the military and its allies and thus pave the way for international assistance to East Timor.

Thereafter – and given that massive aid would soon reach all those needing it, that Xanana Gusmão would be able to undertake his policy of reconciliation, and that

Indonesia's occupation would not be followed by donor's domination – the remaining problems in East Timor thus seemed to be three: that the militias had an escape hatch in Indonesia's western part of the island, that even at the time of updating this text in early 2000 some 150.000 refugees are still stranded with them there, and that all atrocities (which are terrible enough even if some estimates must have been exaggerated) have to be investigated and their perpetrators judged.

Thus we were back in Indonesia – without which those problems could not (and can not) be solved. Until September 23-24, 1999, the situation looked grim indeed. The military was fanning the flames of extreme nationalism, and it had pushed through a law making possible a constitutional *coup d'état*, should it and the then president Habibie take the view that people were protesting too much and threatening stability thereby. In the long run, it would thus have been easier for the military to preserve its power – either by entering into a conservative alliance with Megawati (the then strongest presidential candidate) or by 'saving the nation' from protests against Habibie (should he have been able to buy himself votes enough to become president in the end). So the line in diplomatic and business quarters (and among scholars nourished by them) was as usual that now was not the time to push too hard, for everything might in that case go to rack and ruin. Rather, 'the best' would be a stability pact between Megawati and Wiranto.

Fortunately, however, the students intervened instead. Collectively they deserve the Peace Prize! Yet again it was they who along with some few reformist politicians, came to the succour of the dawning Indonesian democracy. And they did so by using the only method that really bites: resolute popular actions. The military and its allies retired. The respite was but a temporary one, of course. But this is the way it has to go

when real political democracy is almost as dangerous for the establishment as if their property rights had been at stake.

It would be a good thing if the ‘international community’ were finally to learn this. For this was not the first time. As we know, even one of the world’s most devastating economic crisis and harsh external pressures were not enough to persuade the elite to dump Suharto. There was also a need for collective popular action. That was decisive. And in the absence of a strong democracy movement, that took the form of student’s demonstrations and other’s riots. Thereafter the democracy movement was ignored again and the students abandoned. So no transitional government was set up, only instant and shallow elections took place, a political vacuum was created, a catastrophe developed in East Timor, and the military and its civilian associates held on to their positions.

Politically frustrated new middle class?

In processes like these, much hope is usually vested with the capacity of the educated new middle class. In face of the elections, however, the irony is that the Western craftsmen of middle-class democracy did not even manage to make life easier for those who aimed at this within the new liberal oriented PAN-party. It is true that PAN’s own performance, abandoned as it was by most Muslim stalwarts as well, is anyway a clear indication of the increasing importance of urban and semi-urban intellectuals, professionals and educated business people. On the other hand, however, some of the democratic potential of the new middle class may now get lost because of its problems of making a difference within the neo-traditional political framework. The already appearing ‘alternative’ cynicism, the East-European-like privatisation of public social and economic policies, as well as the preference for extra parliamentary

lobbying and pressure group activities do not automatically promote democracy. And it remains to be seen how middle-class groupings now react to the fact that Amien Rais was very active in mobilising the conservative Muslims rather than the reform forces behind Gus Dur during the horse trade election of new president – thus brokering a conservative pact that gave sections of PAN and the other Muslims much more influence in the government than during the elections.

By now, moreover, as Gus Dur and his liberal pragmatic allies are consolidating their positions in the central government, Rais is obviously trying to rally what remains of the Muslim 'axis forces' behind himself. Meanwhile PAN itself is deeply divided and only survived its first congress in mid-February 2000 by postponing the entire debate on whether it should turn explicitly Muslim or not, given the rather poor results in the parliamentary elections.

Beyond aliran politics: de-golkarisation or elite-reconciliation?

The electoral achievements of the PDI-P, the PKB, the PPP (and to some extent PAN) are likely to be interpreted as the return of aliran politics based on the old cultural-cum-religious pillars of the syncretic *prijaji-abangan* combine (PDI-P) and the traditional and modernist Muslim *santris* (primarily PKB and PPP respectively). A brief comparison between the results from the only previous free and reasonably fair elections, 1955, show some striking similarities. At that time the combination of the nationalist party's 22.3 %, the Christian and Catholic parties' some 5 % and the reformist Communist Party's 16.4% comes to almost 45%. The latter party was destroyed in the mid-1960's but now the PDI-P got 33.7%, some splinter parties a few percents, and most of 'the others' may be part of Golkar's 22% (Golkar did not exist in 1955). Further, in 1955 the NU got 18.4 % while this time PKB got 12.6 %

and 'the rest' probably voted the minor NU related parties and NU-sections of Golkar and PPP. Finally, in 1955 the urban oriented modernist Muslim alliance of Masjumi, the minor Muslim PSII and the West oriented Socialist Party got some 25 %, while this time the combination of PPP's 10.7%, PAN's 7.1%, some minor Muslim parties (including Partai Bulan Bintang and Partai Keadilan), and the ICMI-cum-Habibie parts of Golkar comes to roughly the same.

This seemingly stable pattern, however, may rather be an hangover from the past in terms of the only available political machines and mass organisations, while the socio-economic fundamentals have changed.

For instance, while the nationalist party behind Megawati's father, president Sukarno, had its major base among the rulers, administrators and educators of the state on each and every level (and their capacity to command votes), this stronghold was captured by Suharto and Golkar after 1965, which also monopolised the military and big-business. So even if Megawati's PDI-P may try to recapture some of this, it is now more rooted in general anti-monopolistic sentiments, often led or backed-up by small and medium business people (including many ethnic Chinese) who did not benefit much from privileged political contacts under Suharto. And partly this may also be true of Gus Dur's PKB.

So even though their own resources are scarce, some of those new local political and business leaders are now likely to develop into more private based patrons and bosses in close contact with religious leaders, military commanders, and important persons at the centre while also mobilising voters to get 'democratic access' to state resources.

Over the years they may not be able to retain their popular support in face of the great expectations and the possible emergence of groups that try to substitute for the old communists by catering to the less privileged. But of course, the immediately most vital issue is if and how PDI-P, PKB and their allies will try to ‘de-golkarise’ the administration, the military, the public companies and the educational system. A compromise with previous clients of the old regime under new central leadership, as in the Philippines, would hardly promote democratisation and prospects for long term stability but rather an elected oligarchy and potential unrest.

Gus Dur’s pact-order and the political violence

Much pointed in that direction, however, even before the counting of the votes was finished. For instance, the ‘*pro-reformasi*’ parties did not come together and make use of their popular electoral mandate to prevent manipulations and money politics and promote democratic reformists in the appointment of the 65 plus 135 representatives from various sections of the society and the provinces³² respectively who would join the 462 elected parliamentarians and the 38 military representatives in selecting the next president. Rather, elitist horse trading got the upper hand.

Far beyond the elections, the outcome, as we know, was a transition from Suharto’s ‘New Order’ to Gus Dur’s ‘Pact Order’. The Megawati-camp held on to the election results and neglected the need to form a coalition. Even the pet stability-pact of the market and many diplomats between her and Wiranto did not materialise, even though the latter abandoned Habibie. Hence, when Habibie was also refuted by the Assembly and gave in, it was rather the Muslim ‘axis forces’, brokered by Amien Rais and with Gus Dur in the forefront, that got a new lease on life. This was the least worst alternative for the establishment and all alternative contenders³³ abstained. For Rais

(who had been kicked out of Habibi's and Adi Sasono's attempt under Suharto to provide a Malaysian-like transition via ICMI) and for Gus Dur (whose main priority it had been for six years to oppose this ICMI-strategy by all means, even by linking up with Golkar in the 1997 fake elections) this was a victory of sorts. But it took massive demonstrations and riots by Megawati's supporters to then also harbour her and her party that had won the elections. So the only magic that was involved in turning the rioting into dancing in the streets, was that Gus Dur responded by political manipulation rather than military repression.

The new pact includes, thus, the slightly reform and secular oriented sections of Golkar and the military, Amien Rais' and Gus Dur's tactical Muslim alliance, plus Megawati and a few representatives of her party. Aside from objecting to any minister with a corrupt past, and insisting in a formally civilian minister of defence, Gus Dur's main formula seems to have been the inclusion of almost all major sections of the elite (minus Habibi's Golkar-cum-ICMI camp) – at the expense of a coherent and strong cabinet and a functioning opposition.

This kind of pact between soft-liners among the incumbents and moderates among the opposition is not just mainstream analysts' standard recipe for a smooth transition to democracy but also the long standing path nourished by Gus Dur and his associates. The first thing to note, however, is that although Gus Dur himself is more democratically oriented than Megawati, and a sharp liberal oriented Muslim intellectual (rather than a cleric) at that, whose statements like "We make a perfect team – I can't see and she can't talk" has already charmed international media, he remains an elite manipulator whose despotic statements and manoeuvres are too confusing to be predicted by potential enemies.

Secondly and more importantly, the forces and compromises that he is relaying on are likely to turn his pact into a more preservative than reformative one. This is not because Gus Dur or people in his inner circle, like Marsilam Simanjuntak, who came from their joint attempt in the early-90s to form an Eastern European-like Democratic Forum necessarily would like it that way, but because they lack a solid and reasonably radical popular mass movement. The basic logic, thus, is that Megawati's populist mobilisation of people, and the expectations of the mainly unorganised social movement of urban poor that has rallied behind her, would probably have given more space for anti-monopolistic efforts at de-golkarisation than Gus Dur's pact.

Essentially Gus Dur's pact harbours and draws on established organisations and clientelistic networks (including not just religious ones but also Golkar, reasonably loyal businessmen and military officers) that may now shape revised rules of the game and adapt to them.

More fundamentally, moreover, *any* scholarly celebrated pact between moderate incumbents and reformers are up against serious problems in Indonesia. To begin with and as already noted, substantial political democratisation is especially difficult here. The establishment is less solidly based on private and thus non-contested ownership of the essential resources than in many of the third world countries that have formed the basis for empirical generalisations. One indication is the current struggles related to the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). After years of privatising public assets and profits, the crisis has now given rise to a general need among domestic as well as international investors to socialise their losses. Hence, the state is back again as a major owner-cum-actor in the economic field. And anyone (domestic as well as international, public as well as private) who wish to win rather than lose in this far from transparent process of 'reconstruction' need the best of contacts.

Another indication is the heavy involvement of the armed forces in the economy and administration. To roll them back is not just a matter of saying no or trying (as Gus Dur does) to form an elitist pact and assemble international support. The military entered into business on a massive scale already with the nationalisations of (primarily) Dutch companies in the late-1950's. To alter this is about as difficult as doing away with armed landlords through a landreform. But the worst thing is the violence committed by the military or supported by it. East Timor has taught an entire World how it works. Violence was made into established state policy in the massacres of 1965-66. The military and the militias acted the same way then as now. Conflicts and antagonisms are consciously exacerbated. People become so afraid – both of the military and of each other (including of those who have reason to take vengeance) – that the military has been able to make itself seem indispensable, by virtue of its 'protection against instability'. In East Timor, however, those instigating top military and civilian leaders lost control.

Indonesia calls to mind Germany just after World War II and the Holocaust, and still more so South Africa before it settled accounts with apartheid. The truth cannot be repressed if reconciliation and a reasonably functioning democracy is to be possible. But no Nelson Mandela is in sight, nor any ANC. So now, when the democracy movement must be able to re-create that part of Sukarno's and Mohammad Hatta's national project which built on equality and freedom – as opposed to autocracy plus xenophobia – what is needed is extra international encouragement for such a renewed and refined project. Not a mixture of unilateral interventions and concessions to new and old rulers, in combination with a blind aversion to all kinds of nationalism.

Hence, the persistent special importance of the state and the military in the economy makes heavy-duty popular pressure particularly important in Indonesia. But this may now be contained by the new pact. It is indeed promising, that the national commission for human rights, and especially a whole ensemble of human rights activists in civil society have managed to put the spotlight on the military atrocities and to make use of international pressure with regard to East Timor (rather than the other way around). This in turn has allowed Gus Dur to hold back the military, undermine the hawks, and to resist their insurgency campaigns related to political-cum-ethnic and religious violence. But it is important to realise, that despite some attempts at building an organised mass base – of which the Committee for the Disappeared and Repressed's (KONTRAS) support for the organising of the victims themselves is among the most impressive³⁴ – most of the human rights work still rests with elitist middle class groups in Jakarta and some few other cities. So once again we come back to the basic weakness in the process of democratisation: that the civil and especially political societies are extremely weak in Indonesia due to more than thirty years of repressive 'floating mass' politics that was accepted by the West and prevented all kind of popular dissident organising.

While the immediate outcome of Gus Dur's conservative 'Pact Order' is, thus, likely to be rather positive in generating relative stability for the time being and even domesticating the military, the perspectives for the future is rather bleak. The stability is fragile. In large but far from all parts of the country, instant democratic institutions have so far provided legitimisation of a revised political leadership down to the regency level and enabled the major sections of the elite to regulate their conflicts rather peacefully. That's not bad, given the preconditions. But there is no coherent democratic opposition, not to talk of a mass based democratic movement. The elite is

into politics to get hold of resources in a legitimate way. While Gus Dur's 'Pact Order' is inclusive of the established elite (including a few democratic personalities), it is exclusive of most of the actors and movements that really enforced democratisation. And there are few firm links with ordinary people.

Neglected democratic preconditions

The kind of more substantial democratisation which is therefore needed is no far-fetched ideal type. It simply means, that people in general, and not just competing sections of the elite, must have the chance and capacity to make use of the democratic institutions that go with liberal political democracy – so that they can develop and advance their own societal ideas and interests, and select and control their own representatives.

Most scholars would agree, then, that this calls for reasonably genuine political parties – between government and the people – and reasonably genuine mass organisations (behind and in addition to the parties) on the basis of people's societal ideas and/or interests. But Indonesia is short of the first (there is not even a coherent opposition) and lacking the second. Yet, as we know, this has not been given priority to by even self-confident Western 'democracy supervisors' (and now it is neglected again among liberals who like to alter the electoral reform in the direction of American or Philippine politics). Yet, for example, even reasonably enlightened business managers do not seem to bother much about the fact that it must be better to negotiate with genuine unions than having to repress people both inside and outside the factory gates.

Moreover, everyone would agree that democratisation calls for fundamental administrative reforms and real rule of law – or constitutionalism, for short – in

addition to popular sovereignty. The only problem is, that when constitutionalism is not preceding popular sovereignty (as in the West), we either have to say that time is not yet right for democracy – or discuss what socio-economic forces, and what societal dynamics, would then enforce constitutionalism and democracy at the same time. Most literature on the subject (including that produced by the World Bank³⁵) talks at length of what should be done but avoids the problem of what could possibly be the propelling forces. So as long as there is no sign of a viable alternative, we have to return to the basic need of pressure from genuine organisations among the subordinated and abused sections of the population (workers, professionals and businessmen alike). And there are very few such organisations in Indonesia.

The problem is similar with regard to decentralisation, which is increasingly seen as another precondition for democratisation. New and better laws are crafted. But there is absolutely no forceful policy in support of forces and organisations that might prevent the rise of local patron and boss rule; especially not below the district level, where people live but where not even instant democratic changes have taken place – aside from where people themselves have protested against corrupt village leaders and Golkar hegemony.

Or we can turn to the absolutely vital educational sector which has to be totally reformed and de-golkarised after centuries of indoctrination and subordination of both teachers and students. Who will enforce that, if not progressive students, teachers, and cultural workers are encouraged and getting organised?

And let us finish with the need to contain the conflicts between religious and ethnic communities. How shall this be possible, if neo-liberal and religious politicians are linking up with libertarian activists in closing down welfare state measures in favour

of rival civil society associations rather than reforming the public sector and offer universalist alternatives to increasingly important primordial communities?

A democratic vacuum – and a race to fill it

While the major problem between the fall of Suharto's 'New Order' and the rise of Gus Durs 'Pact Order' was the political vacuum, the new primary obstacle is, thus, the democratic vacuum. Neither the established elite nor most genuine pro-democratic actors have firm roots in parties and organisations on the basis of peoples' societal ideas and interests.

This vacuum will now be filled – or at least compensated for – and the race is already on. As we know, the neo-traditional politicians have so far been comparatively successful in making up for their isolation by using populist and clientelist top-down incorporation of ordinary people and drawing on old perspectives, loyalties, and machines. This is likely to be preserved and consolidated during Gus Dur's new 'Pact Order'. Indonesia may be turning from one-man bossism to petty bossism. So while the Indonesian breakthrough is remarkable it is only the end of the beginning. And to a large extent the outcome rests with the capacity of the genuine democracy movement to regain the initiative, exert pressure and offer a political alternative – which will be increasingly difficult if many domestic experts and most foreign supporters keep on promoting liberal American personality and middle class lobby and pressure group politics, including by further altering the electoral laws in this direction.

The prospects are not the best. Despite all advances there is still no unified democratic front. While some leaders prefer to work within the established parties or try to make use of their access to new leaders and influential administrators, others

have been marginalised or have got new opportunities to expand their private projects in civil society. As we have seen in previous sections, the movement is fragmented, focuses on single issues or general propaganda and often fails to link up with, co-ordinate, and guide grassroots activities in civil society. So who is interested in political democratisation?

Now there is a need to rapidly go ahead. NGOs, for instance, might turn membership-based and give priority to the support for popular mass organising. But others like to stay away from state and politics, so we do not know. Many rather autonomous popular initiatives at the grass roots level, including local unions and action groups, might now federate openly. But there are also top-down and foreign funded initiatives, so we do not know. Increasingly many people, and hopefully the students too, are getting engaged in investigating the history and truth about state sponsored crimes against human rights, to fight militarism and religious and ethnic conflicts among people. But anti-statism and civil society romanticism is also part of the problem when there is a need for alternative politics to handle ‘un-civil societies’, so we don’t know. Out of some of this, genuine parties might develop. But now it is even difficult to turn electoral watch movements into parliamentary watch dogs, and now there is mainly a process of fragmentation and depolitisation, so we do not know. The only thing we know for sure is that those are uphill tasks that have proved difficult enough under less harsh conditions, such as in the post-Marcos Philippines³⁶ – and those tasks call for support and close studies.

By the end of 1999, moreover, interest and concern had shifted to the problem of disintegration, primarily in relation to Aceh. The problem is that both unitarists who hail nationalism and federalists who call Indonesia a colonial construct seem to

believe that the country will fall apart without harsh central control. Few recalls how Indonesia emerged out of the anti-colonial struggle for freedom *and* democracy. Few pays attention to the fact that the democratic part of the project was purged from the late 50's and onwards. And few discusses whether the problems and demands on the local level can be handled in a more fruitful way by returning to the concept of democracy in the original national project than to the despotic modernism in Jakarta or the competing ethnic and religious communities in the provinces.

This is not just a question of groups and provinces that like to break away from Indonesia. On a more general level the central structures of authoritarianism are crumbling and the economy is in shambles. As we know, politics will be more localised and the economy more privatised and internationalised (though hardly de-monopolised). So when leading democratic activists often say that local actions and processes, especially in local towns and villages, stand and fall with their own political advances at the centre they might be entirely correct. In fact, the political and economic processes of decentralisation may well imply that a stronger democracy movement may and must also grow from below.

The very processes are complicated and there are no ready made paths. In the Central Java village of Gebjok, for instance, in Karanganyar district, right after the fall of Suharto, a few dissidents asked democracy activists in Solo for help to sue their corrupt *lurah* (village head). The advice, however, was that nothing would change unless they themselves linked up with others and sought the support of the villagers in general. So this they did. A *komite reformasi* was formed to fight the *lurah* who had appropriated money for a fresh water project, over-charged people for land certificates and privatised public land in favour of his cronies. Demonstrations, for instance,

where held at the *lurah*'s and *bupati*'s (the head of the district) offices (the *lurah* is still legally responsible to the *bupati* rather than to the villagers). The *lurah*'s office was occupied for two weeks, and an absolute majority of the villagers came forward to prevent the military and the police from intervening. When the *lurah* was brought to trial and temporarily discharged, the committee continued its work with regular meetings and public gatherings, initiated a co-operative to support agriculture, added the disclosing of local Golkar leaders' usage of the public social safety net for their own political purposes, and then discussed how to gear up by demanding total reformation of the local administration. And this was not dependent on the ups and downs in the rate of foreign reported demonstrations in front of Hotel Indonesia in central Jakarta.

The committee members were hardly revolutionaries. The chairman was a dynamic local factory mechanic in his mid-twenties. Other members included a retired schoolteacher who used to hunt communists in the 1960's but also a much younger and well dressed and educated radical businessman, and a farmer-cum-agricultural labourer. Their party affiliations varied, some supported PDI-P, others the small NU-based PNU and one the conservative Muslim PBB. "But that doesn't matter", they told me, jokingly picking at each other. "That's just general and traditional affiliations. The important thing is our list of what should be done here." This was in June 1999.

My fear was that they would be co-opted and divided by the established politicians and administration on the district level. But their own response at the time was that they did not know what would happen. They just wanted to hold on to their own program and relate to similar committees in nearby villages, and if possible on

‘higher’ levels too. I asked if they knew of any such committee ‘up there’ – but of course they did not, since hardly any existed.

Between hope and reality, my wonder at the time was, thus, if it was really beyond the capacity of the politically more ‘advanced’ pro-democrats at the more central levels to learn from Gebjok, unite on more aggregate but yet concrete minimum platforms (rather than acting as isolated pressure groups or ideological spearheads only) and thus help providing links and an organisational and ideological framework between committees on different levels (before they too were infected by neo-traditional politics).³⁷

Six months later, little of this had happened. On the 27th of November instead, just as I revisited Gebjok, the committee failed miserably. The new bitter lesson, however, is equally important to learn.

It had started well. Golkar lost massively in the June elections and the committee won its legal case against the *lurah*, so an election of a new head of the village would also take place. But then there was political reconciliation among the elite on various levels. The new climate of ‘Pact Order’ took over. No common enemy was left to fight. Personal ambitions gained ground in the committee which split. Two candidates were nominated; one was brought in from outside the group by its till then leader, the dynamic skilled worker; another emerged from within, the educated radical businessman. While PDI-P won the June general elections but remained politically and organisationally weak, and neither caused problem nor gave help to the committee, Golkar lost the people’s sympathies but retained its organisation and informally remained in control of the local administration. Hence, the latter candidate (the radical businessman) was skilfully prevented on legal grounds from running

(formally he was residing just outside the village). The politically less experienced committee was not able to work out an equally smart counter-move. Rather it stubbornly opted instead for boycott. Even worse, it actually tried to prevent the election on that Saturday morning of November 27 when I returned – and was stopped, of course, by the administration and the police, which, thus, appeared as defenders of democracy and people’s right to vote. And this people did, rather massively – and in favour of a Golkar candidate.

It was virtually possible to see how even the initially best possible local and popular *reformasi* group turned out to be totally insufficient without ideological and political structure and leadership.

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On a more general level, finally, the risk is, thus, that this kind of failure of the post cold war idea about instant democracy through the injection of human rights, civil society groups, and liberal elections, opens up for the return of the other extreme thesis that stability and unity can not yet be upheld by democratic means but that elite-led modern development is the only way to stable democracy. In Gebjok an idealist local *komite reformasi* loses out to Golkar and at the centre a hawkish new civilian minister of defence, Juwono Sudarsono, is even making use of the argument about lack of sufficient modernisation and middle class to threaten the entire nation with the return of the military if the generals are getting a sixty-two percent increase in the state budget and if, as he put it, the politicians are not able to create a “healthy and strong” political atmosphere.³⁸

There must be an end to the vacillation between the two extremes. It is not enough that the US finally, on January 14, repudiated any attempts at coups in Jakarta. The idealist thesis is not sufficient and the determinist path ends up in dictatorship. The latter argument was used to legitimate Western support of Suharto's authoritarian modernisation – and not even its 30 years of development helped. Democracy did not emerge until the project broke down. So if we like to learn from history we must realise, that the present problem is not the lack of state control of people but the lack of democratic institutions and of people's chances and capacity to develop and make use of them. In other words, the healthy and stable growth of the world's third largest democracy primarily depends on the development of the popular democracy movement, beyond instant elections and new conservative pact rule. So the historical compromise between the two extremes would be to develop the insufficient civil rights plus elections path to also promote the kind of popular capacities for further democratic development that the practice of top-down modernism have constantly undermined.

CONCLUSION

To summarise briefly, then, the new consensus on the need for democratisation in Indonesia is not good enough. What is on offer is primarily superficial ideological packages and empirical generalisations from quite different cases. There is a need to discuss instead Indonesia's own problematic context and the actors' politics of democratisation. One of several conclusions is that the democracy actors have failed to build links between civil society oriented movements and organised political work with ideological perspectives and focus on collective interests; another is that elite

politicians and local patrons and bosses seem to be more capable of adapting to a neo-traditional electoral framework – in ways that remind of the Philippines; a third is that the June 1999 elections were rather free but not so just and very shallow; a fourth is that this in turn was a major factor behind the September 1999 catastrophe in East Timor; a fifth is that there are no shortcuts to reasonably substantial democratisation and stability in Indonesia – as the deeply embedded state-political violence, the symbiosis between political and economic power, and thirty years of ‘floating mass’ politics are major hindrances. So while Indonesia has now gone from Suharto’s ‘New Order’ to Gus Dur’s ‘Pact Order’, that is only the end of the beginning. The healthy growth and stability of the world’s third largest democracy depends instead on the further development of the popular democracy movement. If this is accepted, the focus in scholarly studies and international aid should shift from the rights and institutions of liberal democracy to the factors and processes that may empower people to really use them.

(December 1999; minor revisions February 2000)

¹ I’m most thankful to all friends cum colleagues, political leaders and activists who in a spirit of mutual trust and interest in critical ideas have spent a great deal of time in informative and exciting discussions with me. Also, in Indonesia, I’m most thankful for Bimo’s dynamic operational assistance. My research is currently financed by Oslo University and, since long, by SAREC, the department for research co-operation within Sida, the Swedish International Development Authority.

² ‘Democracy in Indonesia? Of popular efforts at democratisation under authoritarian rule’, manuscript, Uppsala University, June 18, 1996. A brief and slightly updated summary of the manuscript was published under the title ‘Civil Society and Divisive Politicisation: Experiences from Popular Efforts at Democratisation in Indonesia’ in *Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World*, Özdalga, E. and Persson, S (eds.), Richmond, Curzon Press, 1997.

³ From late-1996 my results are primarily based on news-clippings and continuous visits and follow-up interviews with ‘key informants’, (as well as an ongoing project on the democracy actors and their constituents (at ISAI), jointly led with Arief Budiman), and reported upon in a series of briefer articles, including, (when possible in their English versions): ‘From New to Human Order in Indonesia?’, in *NIAS nytt*, No.3, October 1996 (and *Economic and Political Weekly*, October 5, 1996), ‘En ny politisk kraft i Indonesien? Vad står Folkets Demokratiska Parti för?’ (‘A new political force in Indonesia? What does PRD stand for?’) in *Merdeka och Östtimorinformation*, 1997: 2, ‘Violence in Paradise’, in *Economic and Political Weekly*, January 24, 1998 (and *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 30, No.4, 1998), ‘Crisis in Asia Calls for Political Solution’, in *Economic and Political Weekly*, February 14, 1998, *The Wild Beast and the Sleeping Beauty and Aborted democratisation in Indonesia*, Talk at Indonesia hearing, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, March 16, 1998 (and at the Nobel Institute, Oslo, April 21, 1998), ‘Hjälp till en katastrof: Olle Törnquist ser väst satsa fel ännu en gång i Indonesien’ (‘Support for a catastrophe....’) in *Aftonbladet*, April 8, 1988, ‘The Indonesian Lesson’, in (at first hand) *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, Vol. 30, No.4, 1998 and Aspinall, E, Klinken van, G., and Feith, H. (eds.) *The Last Days of Suharto*, Monash Asia Institute, 1999, ‘Sizing up an appropriate electoral system’, in *Jakarta Post*, 9 December, 1998, ‘No shortcut to democracy: Olle Törnquist speaks with Gerry van Klinken’, in *Inside Indonesia No. 57, 1999*, ‘Will the Students Succeed’, in *Jakarta Post*, February 2, 1999, ‘The birth of the world’s third largest democracy’, in *Jakarta Post*, July 2 and 3, 1999 (and in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 26), ‘The crisis in East Timor’, in *Jakarta Post*, September 27 and 28, 1999 (and in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 39), ‘Students deserve peace prize’, in *Jakarta Post*, 7 October, 1999, and ‘Political pacts have yet to include the people’, in *Jakarta Post*, 22 December, 1999 (and, with the title ‘Indonesia, the day after’, in *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. XXXV, No. 1, 2000).

⁴ A major prize for this kind of summary is that it has been impossible to include full references. Readers with specific queries are welcome to contact >olle.tornquist@stv.uio.no< .

⁵ ‘From New to Human Order in Indonesia?’, in *NIAS nytt*, No.3, October 1996 (and *Economic and Political Weekly*, October 5, 1996),

⁶ This, for instance, was obvious already and even at the August 1998 International Jakarta conference ‘Towards structural reforms for democratisation in Indonesia’, organised by the Ford Foundation and the Centre for Political and Regional Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, LIPI. I shall return to observations in relation to the parliamentary elections.

⁷ For one interesting perspective, see John Markoff's, *Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, 1996, and his 'Really Existing Democracy: Learning from Latin America in the Late 1990s', in *New Left Review*, No. 223, 1997.

⁸ Huntington, Samuel, *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, OK and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. And this, of course, fits well with the general results of the transition projects led by (a)Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, (b) Larry Diamond, Juan Linz and S.M. Lipset, (c) Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, and (d) Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle.

⁹ So entitled because of the Islamic School run by Gus Dur where students managed to get the four leaders to meet on November 10, 1998.

¹⁰ Sidel, John T., 'Macet Total': Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia's 'New Order', in *Indonesia*, Vol.66, October 1998, p.165.

¹¹ For inspiring comparative analyses, see, for instance, Trocki, Carl A., (ed.) *Gangsters, Democracy, and the State in Southeast Asia*, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University, 1998. For the problems of popular democrats under such conditions, see e.g. Törnquist, Olle, 'Popular Movements and Politics of Democratisation: The Philippine Experience in Comparative Perspective' in Mohanty, M. and Mukherji, P.N. with Törnquist, O. *People's Rights: Social Movements and the State in the Third World*. Sage Publications, 1998. The definition of bossism is adapted from the writings of John Sidel, cf. fn. 12.

¹² Cf. Sidel, John, T., 'Philippine Politics in Town, District, and Province: Bossism in Cavite and Cebu', in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (November) 1997.

¹³ Of India here and in the pervious paragraph, see, for example, Brass, Paul R. (ed.), *Riots and Pogroms*, Macmillan, 1996, Brass, Paul R, *Theft of an Idol: Text and the context in the Representation of Collective Violence*, Princeton University Press, 1997, Dreze, Jean and Sen, Amartya, (eds.) *Indian Development. Selected Regional Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, 1996, and Basu, Amrita and Kohli, Atul, (eds.) *Community Conflicts and the State in India*, Oxford University Press, 1998.

¹⁴ For outlines of the new electoral system, see the February 23, 1999, report from the National Democratic Institute *The new framework for elections in Indonesia*. (<http://www.ndi.org/index.htm>)

¹⁵ For the argument in favour of the questions, see see chapter 13 in my *Politics and Development. A Critical Introduction*, Sage Publications, 1998.

¹⁶ Cf. fn. 2.

¹⁷ For a somewhat more extensive discussion in comparative perspective of the theoretical argument, and the approach and design applied below, see *ibid.*

¹⁸ Primarily the following: (a) the relative openness or closure of the political system (widely defined to include not just the state and political institutions but also, for instance, groups putting forward popular demands); (b) the relative stability or instability of the alignments among dominating groups constituting the basis for the established polity; (c) the possibilities for movements to link up with sections of the elite; (d) the capacity and propensity of the state in particular to repress movements. See McAdam, Doug 'Political Opportunities: Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions', in McAdam, d., McCarthy, J.D. and Zald, M.N. (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996....1996. p. 27.

¹⁹ The political system – parts of which are 'established' – is defined widely to include not only the formal political institutions but also, for example, the generation of political pressure and demands from within civil society.

²⁰ For the present purposes it is not necessary to discuss the concept of civil society. What we have in mind is independent associational life among citizens and public space(es) for their communication – which focus on self-governance among and between various segments of the population rather than general public governance among a clearly defined citizen-demos. For a critical discussion of the concept, see chapter 13 in my *Politics and Development.. op.cit.*

²¹ No matter what space there is (according to the actors) for action within the broadly defined established political system, the actors may, thus, differ with respect to whether they give priority to directly affecting (and often trying to take over) political institutions and regulations, thereby trying to change societal life (as do political parties, for instance) or give priority to associational life, self-help activities, co-operatives, public communication etc. thus trying to change societal life directly and only indirectly influencing the political institutions and regulations (as do most NGOs, for instance).

²² To hopefully avoid misunderstandings, the text in the matrix has been slightly revised as compared with previous presentations, including that mentioned in fn. 15 and 16!

²³ Parties must have executive boards in 9 (out of 27) provinces, and in half of the towns and districts in each of those provinces. Also, new parties need at least 10 seats in the national assembly to be able to participate in the next elections (2004).

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- ²⁴ The terms here are while awaiting more catchy and representative ones and the meaning of ‘pluralism’ and (below) ‘social’ is only to indicate the difference between stressing many different ideas and interests and more or less individual action vs. emphasising common ideas, interests and societal co-operation.
- ²⁵ Re. the latter, I am thinking primarily of Rueschemeyer, D.D, Huber-Stephens, E. and Stephens, J.D. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992.
- ²⁶ Mouzelis, Nicos, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*. London: Macmillan, 1986.
- ²⁷ As noted earlier, the main difference between what we have labelled patrons and bosses is that the former may still, to some extent, be related to patron-clientelism and more reciprocal and benevolent relations, while the bosses’ patronage may even be protection against some of their own repression.
- ²⁸ Tarrow, Sidney, *Power in Movement. Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- ²⁹ In the ‘anarchist’ solutions Tarrow also includes, for instance, syndicalism and guild socialism; in the second he adds, for instance, European Christian Democracy. Of course, one could also add reformist communist patterns, for instance in India, to the second category.
- ³⁰ Till recently I used to talk of federative and unitary forms of integration, but with the current Indonesian debate about disintegration, those also seemed to generate biased connotations.
- ³¹ For one account, see Lane, Max, *Mass politics and political change in Indonesia*, paper to the conference on Democracy in Indonesia – the crisis and beyond’, University of Melbourne and Monash University, 11-12 December, 1998.
- ³² Minus, as it turned out, the representatives of East Timor.
- ³³ Including, finally, Yusril Ihza Mahendra of the small conservative Muslim Crescent Star Party PBB who got himself instead the position as minister of Law and Legal Affairs in the new cabinet.
- ³⁴ Komite untuk Orang Hilang dan Tindak Kekerasan
- ³⁵ See eg. *World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997
- ³⁶ See e.g. Törnquist, Olle, ‘Popular Movements and Politics of Democratisation: The Philippine Experience in Comparative Perspective’ ... op.cit, 1998.
- ³⁷ See my piece at the time in *Jakarta Post*, July 2 and 3, 1999.
- ³⁸ *Jakarta Post*, November 23, 1999.